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QUESTIONING INTERVENTION OF RIGHTTOWARD A NEW METHODOLOGY OF
DECISIONMAKING
Gene . Shreve*

Legal thinking about intervention, as about rules of procedure and
evidence generally, has dwelt too much in the middle latitudes of appellate judicial doctrine. There is too great a tendency to examine and
evaluate the process of intervention decisionmaking according to the
viewpoint and function of appellate courts.' Definitive articles on the
procedural phenomenon of intervention are few, 2 and intervention may
have attracted the most attention as a vehicle for comparing the merits
of public versus private law enforcement. 3 The inquiry should be
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. LL.B., 1968; LL.M., 1975, Harvard
University. I wish to thank my colleagues at Vermont Law School for their suggestions and support during my research and preliminary writing, and Professors David Shapiro and Donald
Trautman of Harvard Law School and Allen Vestal of University of Iowa Law School, who were
kind enough to read and make helpful comments on the manuscript. I also wish to thank Wyck
Furcron, Charles Dileva, Charles Quirk, and Stephen Friehofner who, while students at Vermont
Law School, assisted my research on several topics addressed in this article. Finally, I especially
wish to thank Anita Bower, now a student at the Vermont Law School, for her research and
tireless assistance during the past summer when I completed the manuscript.
I See Clark, The ProperFunctionof the Supreme Court's FederalRules Committee, 28 A.B.A.
J. 521 (1942) and note 88 and accompanying text infra.
2 Moore & Levi, FederalIntervention: I The Right to Intervene andReorganization,45 YALE
L.J. 565 (1936); Levi & Moore, FederalIntervention: 11. The Procedure,Status, and FederalJurisdictional Requirements, 47 YALE L.J. 898 (1938); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, andArbitrators,81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968). See Kennedy, Let's AllJoin In:
Intervention Under FederalRule 24, 57 Ky. L. REV. 329 (1969).
Other commentators have attempted to treat intervention as one of several subjects under a
multiparty theme, e.g., Developments in the Law-Multiarly Litigation in the FederalCourts, 71
HARV. L. REV. 874 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD Developments]. This approach enjoyed

particular popularity for a brief period after the federal intervention, joinder, and class action
rules were simultaneously amended in 1966. Cohn, The New FederalRulesof CivilProcedure,54
GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee. 1966 Amendments ofthe
FederalRules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967); Comment, The Litigant andthe
Absentee in FederalMultipartyPractice, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 531 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PENNSYLVANIA Comment].
3 For treatment of private intervention into public litigation, see, e.g., Sullivan, Enforcement
of Government Antitrust Decrees by PrivateParties: ThirdParty Benficiary Rights andIntervenor
Status, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 822 (1975); Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement 4ctions, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HARVARD Note]. For treatment of public
intervention into private litigation, see Berger, Interventionby PublicAgencies in Private Litigation
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broadened by probing the jurisprudential values that appellate judges
infrequently-perhaps almost never-explore in their intervention
decisionmaking, and by probing the particular stress and flavor of intervention controversies that comprise a vital part of the trial court
process, which are often beyond the accessibility of appellate judges.
This article will propose a structure and method of intervention
decisionmaking that seems most realistically calculated to produce
good procedure in a jurisprudential sense. 4 The proposed model would
require the amendment of rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for two purposes: to subject all intervention controversies to a
common framework of decisionmaking criteria that is clearly articulated in the rule itself, and to commit most intervention decisionmaking
to the discretion of the federal district courts. Nonstatutory intervention of right, as administered in paragraph (a)(2) of the present rule, is
functionally incompatible with this model; therefore, this article proposes its abolition.
The functional examination of intervention of right and the implications of its abolition provide a cutting edge for the broad examination in this article of concerns that underlie rule 24 as well as satellite
doctrines. At the same time, the article is intended to provide a model
of critical methodology for examining questions of civil procedure.
Prior attempts have been made to explore themes of jurisprudence and
legal process in the context of procedure, but the tendency has been to
speak in generalities. This article undertakes to fashion a system of
values by which one may critically examine the welter of case data and
conventional assumptions about the nature and purposes of intervention decisionmaking in federal courts. Thus, this work is intended to
enhance simultaneously an understanding of intervention and the
range and applicability of the values themselves.
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT-FUNCTIONALLY DEFINED AND
EXEMPLIFIED

Intervention is a procedure by which a person may become a party
to an ongoing lawsuit on his own initiative. 5 An absentee's need to
intervene is traditionally measured by the possible adverse consequences of the adjudication upon his interests. 6 Intervention incentives
range from the possibility that the adjudication might impair or destroy
in the FederalCourts, 50 YALE L.J. 65 (1940); Note, FederalInterventionin PrivateActions Involving the Public Interest, 65 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 HARVARD Note].
4 See text accompanying notes 55-137 infra.
5 For a survey of methods by which the number of parties in the litigation can be expanded at
the initiative of the existing parties or the court, see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 329.
6 Need was first stated in terms of the harm that might befall the applicant from the litigation.
Berger, supra note 3, at 65, 69; Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 573; HARVARD Developments, supra
note 2, at 897-98.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

a property interest of the absentee 7 to the opportunity to litigate a claim

more quickly or inexpensively as an intervener 8 than would be possible
if the absentee commenced an independent suit.9
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for both
"intervention of right"'10 and "permissive intervention" in the discretion of the court." Intervention of right is a conceptual device that
identifies the more deserving applications for intervention and vouch-

safes them through the gauntlet of party objections and trial court concerns by which less deserving applications-those made on permissive
intervention grounds-will be judged and perhaps rejected. The inter-

vention of right concept proceeds on four assumptions: (1) that in some
situations an absentee's need to intervene will be greater than in others;

(2) that it is possible to generalize about situations of greater need by
creating a category that distinguishes them from other intervention circumstances where the possible adverse consequences of the litigation
on the absentee's interest will not be as great; (3) that it is desirable to

increase the probability that applications falling within the category of
greater intervention need will be granted; and (4) that this can be accomplished by using the category to invoke decisional standards
weighted more in favor of granting intervention than those standards
that might otherwise be applied in intervention decisionmaking.
The standards by which nonstatutory intervention of right is to be
determined are contained in paragraph (a)(2)12 of rule 24,13 which pro7 See note 53 infra.
8 There appears to be no consensus on whether the term should be spelled "intervener" or
"intervenor." See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953), where both spellings appear in the opinion. I have selected the "er" spelling because it seems closer to plain English
usage. For a review of the matter and similar conclusion, see Shapiro, supra note 2, at 725 n. 18.
9 See note 65 infra.
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
12 Section 24(a)(1) also provides for intervention of right
but does nothing more than affirm the validity of unconditional rights to intervene granted by
other statutes .... The inclusion of this provision in Section 24(a) was apparently an attempt
by the court to complete the section as a catalogue, if only by reference, of the situations
where a person may intervene by right.
Note, Intervention ofPrivatePartiesUnderFederalRule 24, 52 COLuM. L. REV. 922, 922-23 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA Note]. Statutory intervention of right is beyond the focus of this
article because its operation is substantially independent of rule 24.
13 In its entirety, the rule is as follows:
Rule 24. Intervention
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
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vides:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action. .

.

. (2) when the applicant claims an

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, un-4
less the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.'

The rule does not state expressly that situations described in paragraph
(a)(2)-intervention of right-reflect a greater need to intervene than
the circumstances of convenience and judicial economy that are described for permissive intervention in paragraph (b)(2). Nonetheless,
the rule provides that timely placement of one's case within the catelaw or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon
any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to
the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted
to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon
the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
The same procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to
intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is
drawn in question in any action to which the United States or an officer, agency, or employee
thereof is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as
provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 2403.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
14 See note 13 supra. At least 29 states and the District of Columbia recognize intervention of
right with language substantially similar to (a)(2) quoted above. ALA. CODE R. Civ. P. 24; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 24; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 387 (West); COLO. REV. STAT. R. Civ. P.

24; DEL. CODE ANN. R. Civ. P. 24; D.C. CODE ENCYCL. D.C. CT. R. 24 (West); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 81A-124; HAWAII R. Civ. P. 24; IDAHO CODE R. Civ. P. 24; IND. CODE ANN. CT. R. TRIAL 24
(Burns); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-224; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 24 (Baldwin); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, R. Civ. P. 24; MASS. ANN. LAWS, Civ. R. 24 (Law. Co-op); MINN. STAT. ANN.

R. Civ. P. DIST. CT. 24 (West); Mo. ANN. STAT. R. Civ. P. 52.12 (Vernon); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-2701-24; NEV. REV. STAT. R. Civ. P. 24; N.J. STAT. ANN. SUP. CT. & SUR. CT. R. 4:33
(West); N.M. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. DIST. CT. 24; N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-l; N.D. CENT. CODE R.
Civ. P. 24; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. R. Civ. P. 24 (Baldwin); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-6-24;
TENN. CODE ANN. R. Civ. P. 24; VT. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 24; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.190; W.
VA. CODE R. Civ. P. 24; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.09 (West); Wyo. STAT. R. Civ. P. 24.

Six other states recognize intervention of right in the manner it was maintained in federal rule
24 prior to the 1966 amendment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26.1; MD. ANN. CODE R. Civ. P. 208;
MICH. STAT. ANN. GEN. CT. R. 209; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3:131 (McKinney); R.I. GEN. LAWS
R. Civ. P. 24; UTAH CODE ANN. R. Civ. P. 24. For a discussion of the 1966 amendment to I (a) of
federal rule 24, see notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra. An earlier survey of state intervention law may be found in C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 420-27 (2d ed.
1928). For a discussion of the effect of the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on state procedural reform, see Clark, The Injfuence of FederalProceduralReform, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 160-62 (1948).
Although the primary model in this article will be intervention in federal district court, the
discussion applies equally to state practice where the procedural device of intervention of right is
utilized.
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gory described by paragraph (a)(2) "shall" entitle an applicant to intervene, whereas
timely satisfaction of the description of paragraph (b)(2)
"may"' 5 (or may not) result in intervention. Moreover, paragraph
(b)(2) suggests decisional standards for the trial court "[i]n exercising
its discretion"' 6 that may support either the granting or the denial of
intervention. In contrast, paragraph (a)(2) provides the trial court with
no authoritative basis for denying a conforming application except untimeliness. 17
15 See note 13 supra. The function of "shall" and "may" in rules and statutes is to aid in
determining when lower court decisions are open to redecision ("shall") and when the matter is
committed to the lower court's discretion ("may"). Interpreting "shall" and "may" as they appeared in FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a) providing for the substitution of parties, the Supreme Court stated,
"When the same Rule uses both 'may' and 'shall,' the normal inference is that each is used in its
usual sense-the one act being permissive, the other mandatory." Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S.
482, 485 (1947). Cf Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (construing "shall" in
FED R. Civ. P. 56(e) as "mandatory"). Professor Maurice Rosenberg has reported a strong tendency among state trial judges he surveyed to infer discretion from the words "may permit" in a
hypothetical intervention rule.
They adopted a similar interpretation of the words "in the interest of justice" in other rules,
viewing that phrase as another form of discretionary grant. It was only when the rule specifically provided that the court "shall direct" or "shall order" particular acts when criteria are
satisfied that they doubted the existence of discretionary power.
Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion ofthe Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635,
657 (1971).
At the same time, the significance that can be derived from the words alone is limited.
While it is true in construction of statutes, and presumably also in the construction of federal
rules, that the word "may" as opposed to "shall" is indicative of discretion or a choice between two or more alternatives, the context in which the word appears must be the controlling
factor.
United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 996 (1971). See
also Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For a similar view of the significance of the terms in English statutory interpretation, see 36 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 433

(3d ed. 1962).
Intervention of right requires that the initial trial court decision denying intervention be
viewed as nondiscretionary, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra. Hence, there should be
a necessary link between "shall" and intervention of right in (a) of rule 24 and "may" and
permissive or discretionary intervention under $ (b). The terms appear especially capable of con(b) of rule 24 itself articulates the
tributing to a clear "right-permissive" distinction because
purpose of conferring discretion and some of the circumstances under which it is exercised. See
Rosenberg, supra, at 659-60.
16 "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
17 The appropriate limits of the untimeliness exception have been set as follows:
[T]he prejudice to the original parties to the litigation that is relevant to the question of
timeliness is only that prejudice which would result from the would-be intervener's failure to
request intervention as soon as he knew or reasonably should have known about his interest
in the action. . . . [T]o take any prejudice that the existing parties may incur if intervention
is allowed into account under the rubric of timeliness would be to rewrite Rule 24 by creating
an additional prerequisite to intervention as of right.
Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). See also
note 73 and accompanying text infra.
The conclusion that the applicant fits the category of intervention of right is tantamount to a
conclusion that the intervention must be granted. This result comes in part from the operative
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The most significant functional characteristic of intervention of

right may be the large degree to which it implicates federal appellate
courts in routine intervention decisionmaking. In practice, the federal
district court is almost always a court of first and last resort when it
decides to grant intervention applications grounded on either
paragraphs (a)(2) or (b)(2).l 8 Denials of intervention are reviewable as
final orders.19 The functional implication of the discretion 2° conferred
language employed in I (a) and (b), see note 15 supra,and in part from the absentee concern that
is behind the distinction. Prior to the adoption of the original rule 24, it was said that "[tihe
absolute right to intervene connotes that the intervener's interest in the proceeding is so great that
in justice he must be allowed to protect his interest in the case." Levi & Moore, supra note 2, at
902. This means that, according to the rule, one intervening of right "should be permitted to
intervene without consideration of the hardship thrust upon the litigants." PENNSYLVANIA Comment, supra note 2, at 542-43. See Cohn, supra note 2, at 1232; HARVARD Developments, supra
note 2, at 902.
18 Orders granting intervention are not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)
by parties opposing the application since they do not finally conclude the interests of any of the
new or old parties to the litigation. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 368 n.128; Shapiro, supra note
2, at 748 n.121. See also In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480,484 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,426 U.S. 925
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ. and Powell, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1972). Cf Pacific Union Conference of
Seventh Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 1305, 1306 (1977) (denial of summary judgment not
a final order under § 1291).
Appeal of an order granting intervention is technically available through § 1291 as an included point of review from final judgment subsequently concluding the case. See 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.13[7] (2d ed. 1975); COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 930. Appeal of
an order granting intervention after trial is largely illusory, however. "[S]ince lower courts generally hedge with a statement that the granting of the petition was based on an exercise of discretion
as well as on the determination that petitioner had an absolute right, a reversal is virtually confined to the abuse of discretion situation." Id Compare Southwest Ga. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Wainwright, 241 Ga. 355, 245 S.E.2d 306 (1978) (trial court's allowance of intervention on
strength of a state rule similar in relevant respects to federal rule 24, note 14 supra, was affirmed
upon a conclusion that the trial court had not abused its discretion) with Stockton v. United States,
493 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing an order granting intervention of right on appeal from a
subsequent final judgment). For a discussion of the limited reach of abuse of discretion as a
reviewing standard, see notes 20 & 21 infra.
Delay in the opportunity of parties opposing intervention to obtain review of the matter also
works against reversal.
As a practical matter. . . since petitioner will have already established his claim in a trial on
the merits and since any disruption of the original action will already have been suffered, a
determination that intervention was improper will serve no useful purpose and no case has
been found in which an order granting intervention has been reversed.
COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 930-31. See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1923 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. But see
Stockton v. United States, 493 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1974). The decision in Stockton seems incorrect. Plaintiffs' attorney in a tax refund case was permitted to intervene to protect his fee on an
application based upon (a)(2) of rule 24. While the court's conclusion that the intervener lacked
a basis under T (a)(2) for intervention is open to question, see Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1970), the decision in Stockton is most troublesome since it appears to nullify a
jury verdict in favor of the intervener because there was a means other than intervention available
to press his claim.
19 Denials of intervention are reviewable as "final" orders under § 1291. New York Pub. In-
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upon trial judges under paragraph (b)(2) is that, within broad limits, 2 1
terest Research Group, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 516 F.2d 350, 351
n.1 (2d Cir. 1975); Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1970);
Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 156 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965). The text of
§ 1291 does not require that those seeking appeals be parties to the case, and courts have wisely
chosen not to read that requirement into the statute since it would have the "Catch-22" effect of
turning the basis of the appeal into a jurisdictional bar. The matter was settled in Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947). Finding jurisdiction to review
the denial of intervention, Justice Murphy wrote of the appellant: "[S]ince he cannot appeal from
any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying
intervention has the degree of definiteness which supports an appeal therefrom."
There is confusion whether one whose intervention is denied also has standing to appeal that
order from a subsequent final judgment rendered between the parties. Allen Calculators, Inc. v.
National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944), has been offered to support standing, Annot.,
Appealabilityof Order Grantingor DenyingRight of Intervention, 15 A.L.R.2d 336, 369 (1951), but
this appears to be based on a misreading of the case. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 524 (1947), it was suggested that an applicant for intervention
"cannot appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene," but the question was not directly before the Court.
There has been little reason to clarify the point. If the frustrated applicant for intervention
wishes to appeal at all, it is in his tactical interest to do so as quickly as possible. The applicant
has nothing to gain by waiting for final judgment between the parties, when denial of intervention
can be appealed immediately.
It is possible for federal appellate courts to refuse to stay the main proceeding while considering the intervention appeal. See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322
U.S. 137 (1944). Although denial of a stay may be appropriate in some cases, it will often be
unfair to permit the litigation to continue without the applicant pending appeal. To the extent
that the intervener needs to intervene to influence the outcome of the judgment, he should be
permitted to influence as many important events in the case as possible. The appellate court will
feel an understandable reluctance to require the parties to relitigate with the intervener if too
much has transpired by the time of decision. For an example of similar concerns in a different
context, see note 18 supra (party appeal of grants of intervention from a final judgment). And to
the extent that the applicant's need to intervene is coupled with a claim for judicial economy, see
note 161 infra, that additional ground is likely to disappear if the litigation has progressed substantially since the application was denied.
20 The definition of "discretion" provided by Dean Sacks and the late Professor Hart, "the
power to choose between two or more courses of action each of which is thought of as permissible," is quite helpful. A. SACKS & H. HART, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 162 (1958). In his excellent article, Professor Rosenberg has
refined this definition into types of discretion. He begins with what he describes as "primary
discretion" where "the court is free to render the decision it chooses ....
In such an area, the
court can do no wrong, legally speaking, for there is no officially right or wrong answer." Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 637. Professor Rosenberg offers as examples the discretion of the trial
judge in declaring mistrials and refusing to order a special verdict. Id at 650-51. What Professor
Rosenberg then describes as a "secondary" type of discretion appears to be the kind of discretion
enjoyed by trial judges in denying applications of intervention grounded on [ (b)(2) of rule 24.
This type of discretion occurs "when the rules of review accord the lower court's decision an
unusual amount of insulation from appellate revision. In this sense, discretion is a review-restraining concept. It gives the trial judge a right to be wrong without incurring reversal." Id at
637. "[S]econdary discretion is, for practical purposes, confided solely to trial courts, and is essentially a review-limiting concept." Id at 638 (emphasis in original).
21 The shorthand statement of the standard usually applied is that I (b)(2) denials will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash
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the decision of the trial judge denying intervention will be accepted

upon appeal whether or not the court of appeals would have reached

the same conclusion had it elected to redecide the case. 22 Federal appellate courts do not, however, exhibit comparable restraint when re-

viewing denials of applications for intervention of right. Trial court
denials of intervention sought under paragraph (a)(2) have not enjoyed
the relative insulation from review accorded discretionary decisions.
Rather, federal appellate court judges typically make a de novo deter-

mination whether the intervention of right claimed by the applicant

should be granted. 23 Thus, intervention of right amounts to the right of
redecision of his motion to intervene, should
the applicant to appellate
24
that motion be denied.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Elements of intervention of right may be found in English 25 and
Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944). The standard has also been applied to uphold denial of
applications for statutory intervention held to be permissive under (b)(l) of rule 24 rather than
of right under (a)(l). United States v. Marion County Sch. Dist., 590 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir.
1979); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 560 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
The reversal of federal trial court orders denying rule 24(b)(2) interventions as an abuse of
discretion is so difficult that authorities have questioned whether any case has been reported resting reversal solely on that ground. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1923; Levi & Moore,
supra note 2, at 905. Professors Wright and Miller exclude from their search those cases in which
an additional ground supported reversal, or when the trial court erroneously failed to exercise
discretion. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1923 nn.83 & 84. A case has finally appeared
that seems to fit their description, Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977), but the
strength of their conclusion remains unchanged.
22 In Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1975), the appellant, a state civil
rights commission, sought review of the denial of its application to intervene based, interalia,on
(b)(2). The court cited several cases where intervention of state civil rights commissions had been
granted under (b)(2) in similar circumstances, but refused to reverse the denial in the instant
case. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court stated, "Rule 24(b) contemplates that judges may
properly reach different decisions in generally similar circumstances." Id at 1225. See 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1913.
23 "[T]he appellate court can substitute its judgment for that of the trial court if it regards the
urgency great enough to warrant a determination that intervention should be of right." F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 514 (2d ed. 1977).
24 Even if rule 24 designated the category of situations described in 1(a)(2) as more deserving
but committed all decisions to the sound discretion of the trial court, applicants appearing to fall
within the description would doubtless still enjoy some relative advantage over others seeking to
intervene. Yet, because of the trial court's authority under the mantle of discretion, the implications of satisfying the description would not be so authoritative as to be considered intervention of
right. Demonstration that the application fell within the preferred category would be no more
than persuasive authority for granting the intervention. If disregarded, the distinction would become lost in the folds of the trial court's discretion. See Clark, SpecialProblems in Draftingand
InterpretingProceduralCodes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 497, 501 (1950).
25 See Advisory Committee Notes to original rule 24, FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 28 U.S.C. app.
(1976).
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American 26 decisions prior to the original adoption of rule 24 in 1938.
Chief credit for developing and articulating the distinction between discretionary intervention and intervention of right belongs, however, to
Professors Moore and Levi, who authored a seminal article in 1936 that
strongly influenced the original shape of rule 24.27
Moore and Levi divided into two categories cases where appellate
courts were willing to reverse lower court denials of intervention nominally for "abuse of discretion." The first category represented situations where a possible judgment between the original parties would, by
res judicata, bind the absentee in any subsequent attempt to protect his
interest, and where representation of the absentee's interest by an original party was inadequate. 28 The second category included situations
where the absentee claimed an interest in property under actual control
of the court, and where distribution of the property without the participation of the absentee would impair the subsequent value of the absentee's claim. 29 The authors observed that "[i]n referring to that large
class of cases in which permission to intervene must be granted and
where denial thereof is always an abuse of discretion, it seems artificial
to talk in terms of discretion, the right being, rather, absolute. ' 30 In
thus distinguishing these two categories from what was seen as discretionary intervention, the authors presented an analysis that valued intervention applications and articulated consequent decisional standards
in a manner more complete and methodical than that reflected in the
literature 3t and in most opinions 32 up to that time. These two catego26 See Levi & Moore, note 2 supra; Moore & Levi, note 2 supra. For discussions of the history
of intervention practice generally, see F.JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 512; Moore &
Levi, supra note 2, at 568-76.
27 Moore & Levi, note 2 supra.
28 Id.at 581, 591-95. The authors offer as an example the stockholder who may have wished
to intervene to protect his interest in the corporation when the corporate directors were already
parties. Id at 592-94.
29 Id at 581, 582-91. One of the authors' examples is the absentee who had an interest in
property that was the subject of a foreclosure proceeding. Id at 583.
Justice Stewart's dissent in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.El Paso Natural Gas Co. is also
illuminating.
Intervention to assert an interest in property within the court's control or custody derives
from the English doctrine of appearance pro interesse suo. When a court acquired in rem
jurisdiction over property, by admiralty libel, sequestration, receivership, or other process, a
person claiming title or some other legal or equitable interest was allowed to come in to assert
his claim to the property. Otherwise, he would have been subject to the obvious injustice of
having his claim erased or impaired by the court's adjudication without ever being heard.
Elements of this procedure were gradually assimilated in this country. .. and provided the
foundation for intervention doctrne in the federal courts.
386 U.S. 129, 144-45 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30 Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 581. These categories became the basis for nonstatutory
intervention of right in 1 (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the original rule 24. See note 34 infra. Thereafter,
discretion was associated with permissive intervention under the original (b), and abuse of discretion took on its present, more restricted meaning as a reviewing standard. See note 21 supra.
31 Earlier commentators were more concerned with the threshold question of the competence
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ries became the basis for nonstatutory intervention of right as codified
33
in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the original rule 24.

The structure and approach of the original rule 34 in delineating
and weighing intervention applications established fully the elements
of intervention of right as distinct from permissive intervention standards. Paragraph (a)(2) stated that timely interventions of persons who
might be bound and are not adequately represented "shall" be
granted, 35 and paragraph (a)(3) gave the same preferred treatment to

absentees claiming an interest in property within the control of the
of courts to grant intervention. See Eliot, Interventionsin the FederalCourts, 31 AM. L. REV. 377
(1897); Note, The Usefulness of Intervention as a Remedy in Attachment, 20 MICH. L. REV. 96

(1921).
32

See Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 580-81.

33 Curiously, while the article of Professors Moore and Levi is cited liberally in the Advisory

Committee Notes to original rule 24, the committee cites authority for the distinction between
discretionary intervention and intervention of right solely from English practice. Advisory Committee Notes to original rule 24, FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976). This statement is taken
at face value by Professors Wright and Miller, 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1903, but
it seems difficult to do so. Whatever uncertainty of labels or lack of methodological self-consciousness was evident from the American cases they collected, the research of Professors Moore
and Levi establishes the existence of the distinction in American jurisprudence prior to the adoption of rule 24. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. Cf Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1941) (referring to "the codification of general doctrines of intervention contained in Rule 24(a)").
34 The original rule read as follows:
Rule 24. Intervention
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or
may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3)
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon all
parties affected thereby. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. The
same procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn
in question in any action to which the United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof
is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United States as provided in
the Act of August 24, 1937, c. 754 § 1.
I F.R.D. xciv-xcv (1938).
For a review of federal intervention procedure before adoption of rule 24, see Moore & Levi,
supra note 2, at 577-80. For a discussion of federal procedure before the rules generally, see Clark
& Moore, A New Federal Civil ProcedureL The Background, 44 YALE L.J, 387 (1935).
35 For a discussion of cases where the applicant was considered sufficiently susceptible to be-

ing bound by the judgment to be entitled to intervene under this paragraph, see text and footnotes
appearing in COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 923-24.
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court. 3 6 By contrast, the trial court was free in its discretion to deny

any application for intervention grounded on paragraph (b)(2) 37 if in
would be too burdensome on origiits view the absentee's participation
38
court.
the
or
parties
nal
Yet, the apparent confines of intervention of right were not uniformly respected. Some federal appellate courts were unable to resist
reversing trial court denials of applications to intervene although the
applications appeared to represent situations lying outside categories
created by either paragraphs (a)(2) or (a)(3). Such appellate redecisions might have been justified as a reversion to prerule practice 39 and

an expansion of the concept of abuse of discretion. Courts chose instead to expand the meanings of paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) beyond
their apparent textual limitations. Federal appellate courts reversed intervention denials on the strength of paragraph (a)(2) when the absentee, though not in danger of being bound by res judicata, might
nonetheless be bound by the judgment in a practical sense. 40 Intervention denials were reversed on the strength of paragraph (a)(3) when an

absentee's property interest was jeopardized by the litigation,4 1 even
though the property was not subject to the control of the court.

36 For a review of cases decided under this paragraph, see 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
18, § 1907.
37 Paragraph (b)(2) appeared in the original rule in substance as it does in the present rule 24.
Compare the original rule 24, note 34 supra, with the present rule, note 13 supra.
The paragraph was amended to bring it in line with the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-59 (1940). See Nuesse v. Camp, 385
F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In UnitedStates Realty, the Supreme Court allowed the SEC to
intervene under (b)(2) although it appeared to lack a claim or defense in common with the main
action. For a discussion of the case and the uncertainty over the meaning of (b) that followed
prior to the adoption of the amendment, see 1951 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 323-28.
38 See, e.g., Degge v. City of Boulder, 336 F.2d 220, 222 (10th Cir. 1964); Stadin v. Union
Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 920-21 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963).
39 See note 30 supra.
40 See Cohn, supra note 2, at 1229 & n.101. A good example of the extension of (a)(2) from
its res judicata base was Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 304 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Small refiners who were the beneficiaries of a regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior
sought to intervene in an action brought by large refiners to invalidate the order. The court concluded that invalidation of the order would be as prejudicial to the applicants for intervention "as
if they were bound by it under the doctrine of resjudicata," id at 394, and ruled they were entitled
to intervene as of right under I (a)(2). For other examples, see generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 18, § 1907, n.91. See Berger, supra note 3, at 69.
At the same time, a number of decisions continued to adhere to a strict res judicata test. See,
e.g., Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21 (1951).
41 "[S]ome decided cases virtually disregarded the language of this provision." Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to rule 24, FED. R. CIv. P. 24, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976). See also
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 400-01 n.169. The Advisory Committee Notes cite Formulabs, Inc. v.
Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960), as an example. There, a
licensor of a secret formula was found to have a right under I (a)(3) to intervene in order to.
protect the secret against disclosure by the licensee, who was already a party. The secret was being
sought by the opposing party through discovery.
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At the same time some appellate courts were placing an expansive
gloss on paragraph (a)(2), the United States Supreme Court gave the
paragraph a construction so narrow as to suggest its invalidity. In Sam
Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,42 the Court equated the "may be

bound" language of paragraph (a)(2) with res judicata, and found this
requirement to be at odds with the rule's further requirement that an
applicant's interests be inadequately represented by the existing parties.
If the applicant's interests in fact were represented inadequately, he
could not possibly be threatened by res judicata. 43 In short, the dual
requirements of inadequate representation and the prospect of being
bound by res judicata were mutually exclusive, and the rule was thus
impossible to satisfy.44
If the dilemma posed in Sam Fox was not inevitable,45 it did serve
as an impetus for the 1966 amendment of paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3)
of rule 24.46 Paragraph (a)(2) of the present rule continues to require a
showing by the absentee of possible inadequate representation by existing parties, but no longer requires that the absentee run the risk of
being bound by the litigation. It is enough that the applicant have "an
interest. . . [and be] so situated that the disposition of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." 47 The amendment also attempted to bring the rule in line with
earlier cases48 that had stretched the concepts of "may be bound" and
of "property in the custody of the court. '49 The historic categories of
42 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
43 Id at 691. Here, the Court relied upon Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
44 The case probably dampened the continued effectiveness of I (a)(2), see R. FIELD, B.
KAPLAN &

K.

CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

1004 (4th ed.

1978); however, "[1]ower courts were somewhat incredulous about the dilemmatic interpretation
of the rule and showed a distinct tendency to balk at it." Kaplan, supra note 2, at 402 & n.173.
45 Criticism of Sam Fox was based upon a reading of original (a)(2) as addressing more
situations than those where the applicant ran a formal risk of being bound in a res judicata sense.
Cohn, supra note 2, at 1229 & n.103; Note, Intervention ofRight in ClassActions." The Dilemma of
FederalRule of CivilProcedure24 (a)(2), 50 CALIF. L. REV. 89, 91-92 (1962). The alternative of a
broader interpretation of I (a)(2) had been raised before Sam Fox. See Berger, supra note 3, at
85; HARVARD Developments, supra note 2, at 900. See also note 40 supra. The Court's decision
seems accurate, however, in light of the history of intervention of right preceding the rule and of
the confining language of original I (a)(2). It is difficult to fault the Court for declining to rewrite
the rule by judicial interpretation and leaving the task to be undertaken and completed by the
draftsmen in 1966. See Clark, supra note 1, at 523; Weinstein, Reform of the FederalRule-Making
Process,63 A.B.A.J. 47, 48 (1977). For a description of the rulemaking process, see Kaplan, supra
note 2, at 357-58.
46 See the dissent of Justice Stewart in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129, 153-54 (1967); Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to rule 24,
FED. R. CIv. P. 24, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976).
47 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
48 See notes 40 & 41 supra.
49 There is no question that a purpose of the amendment was to bring the rule in line with
cases that had gone beyond the text of (a)(3). See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 337; note 46 supra.
The new rule also legitimated earlier cases under (a)(2) that had found an interest supporting
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intervention of right represented by paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the
original rule were incorporated into the broader category of the present

rule 24 (a)(2).
The Need to Reassess Intervention of Right
From the preceding historical overview, it is possible to conclude
that elements of intervention of right predated rule 24; that the original
rule centered and systematically arranged these elements by delineating categories of intervention applications and weighing decisional
standards to be applied to the categories according to the need of the
absentee to intervene; and that the concept of intervention of right is

preserved in the present form of the rule. It is also possible to conclude

that the operation of rule 24 generally achieves the functional purpose
of intervention of right. In cases where the interest of the absentee is

most likely to be adversely affected, paragraph (a)(2) provides an initial
trial court directive and a mechanism for appellate redecision that, together, enhance the probability that intervention will be granted.
One may concede the legitimate value of protecting the especially
deserving absentee by intervention of right, and the substantial realization of this value by the present operation of rule 24. Absentees facing
the possibility of prejudice from the stare decisis effect of the litigation 50 may be able to intervene by right under paragraph (a)(2), 5 1 as
may those whose opportunity to obtain future injunctive relief might be
prejudiced by the possible shape of a decree in a pending case. 52 Those
with an interest in property within control of the court continue to be
able to intervene as of right.53 So may those whose interests are not
intervention other than the possibility of being formally bound and that had been eclipsed by Sam
Fox. For a survey of these cases, see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 502-03 (1965).
50 On the nature and effect of cases as precedent, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-67 (1921); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 20, at 587-88; Pound, Some
Thoughts About Stare Decisis, 13 NACCA L.J. 19 (1954).
51 See, e.g., Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General Elec., 581 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F. 2d 1341
(10th Cir. 1978); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1967). See Note, FederalCivil Procedure-Intervention
of Right Under Rule 24-State Bank Commissioner-Enforcementof NationalBank Act, 18 AM.
U.L. REV. 202 (1968); Note, FederalCivil Procedure. PrejudicialEffects of StareDecisis Can CompelInterventionof Right UnderRule 24(a), 1967 DUKE L.J. 1251 [hereinafter cited as DUKE Note].
By the same token, the significance of a decision as adverse precedent will not invariably
suggest a right to intervene, even under the amended rule.
52 E.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 268 (5th Cir. 1977). See Kaplan, supra note
2, at 405; 1976 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 1183.
53 See, e.g., Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878 (1970); American Jerex Co. v. Universal Alum. Extrusions, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 524
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Oceana Int'l, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Bramble Transp.,
Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 97 (Super. Ct.), a id, 294 A.2d 104 (Del. 1971). Delaware
has adopted a rule with language substantially similar in relevant respects to federal rule 24. See
note 14 supra.
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literally within the reach of the court and who can neither be bound
nor prejudiced by staredecisis because their interests may not be cognizable against any of the parties in future litigation, but only so long as
the practical harm possible to them from the litigation is sufficiently

great.5

4

Nonetheless, I believe that one must balance the positive effects of
intervention of right against an assessment of the adverse consequences
of such intervention on the overall function of rule 24 as a decisionmaking tool for resolving intervention controversies. The quality of intervention decisionmaking under the rule is limited by intervention of
right, and a reassessment of the continuing desirability of the rule is
thus in order.
THE FRUSTRATION OF PROCEDURAL VALUES BY INTERVENTION OF
RIGHT

The foremost quality of good procedural rules is fairness. A good
procedure should be designed to be equally accessible to all litigants,
expeditious, and capable of presenting a sufficiently unobstructed view
of the rights of the parties so that the court can decide fairly the merits
of the case.5 5 This article posits that, in the context of intervention
54 See Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22, 28 (8th Cir. 1957). In this case, a railroad
was sued on the ground of private nuisance by neighboring landowners seeking to abate operation
of a spur to Ford's plant. Ford sought to intervene on the ground that it would be unable to
continue to operate the plant if unable to use the spur. The trial court's denial of Ford's application was reversed by the court of appeals, which held Ford entitled to intervene of right. While it
is questionable whether Ford could place its application within (a) as then written, the facts of
the case suggest Ford would be able to intervene of right under the present rule. See United
States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 412 (D.C. Minn. 1972); United States v. Simmonds
Precision Prod., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "In Simmonds it is not clear that the
Note, PrivateParticipation
union had a legally cognizable claim or defense against anyone.
in DepartmentofJusticeAntitrustProceedings,39 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 171 n.l 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO Note].
55 Professor Rosenberg described eloquently why a value-centered approach to procedure is
important.
In a democracy, process is king to a very large extent, and this is especially so in the judicial
branch. Even though substantive laws command attention, procedural rules ensure respect.
Why is this true? One powerful reason is that when people end up in court, their case typically is not a matter of right against wrong, but of right against right. Decent process makes
the painful task of deciding which party will prevail bearable and helps make the decision
itself acceptable.
Rosenberg, Devising ProceduresThat are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 797, 797 (1971). See P. CARRINGTON & B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 2 (1977).

As one might expect, approaches in the description of procedural values differ. Professor
Rosenberg offers a longer list than I have. Rosenberg, supra, at 802-04. Professors James and
Hazard appear to ascribe only "secondary" importance to the list of values presented. F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 2-3. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 1: "These rules... shall be construed
to secure
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Yet, Ithe
suspect
that at the bottom of most efforts to wrestle with procedural jurisprudence
is a
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decisionmaking, 56 these procedural values will be best advanced by
three elements of decisional methodology. First, the framework of
decisionmaking criteria should be fully developed and made applicable
to all intervention controversies. Second, the standards for intervention
decisionmaking should be clearly articulated in the rule itself. Finally,
with a few exceptions, intervention decisionmaking should be committed to the discretion of the district courts, with limited opportunity for
appellate court redetermination. The continuing desirability of the
present intervention of right procedure should be analyzed in terms of
its functional compatibility with these elements. It is the thesis of this
article that nonstatutory intervention of right under rule 24 is functionally incompatible with this methodology. Therefore, in the interest of
fair procedure, the rule should be amended.
The DecisionmakingFramework
GeneralIntervention Concerns.-Standardsfor intervention decisionmaking must be derived from an appreciation of the consequences
to the original parties, the applicant, and the court of granting or deny-

ing applications. A grant of intervention may adversely affect the original parties in a number of ways. Intervention forces the nominal coparty to relinquish partial management of the case. 57 Moreover, the

intervener may complicate the original parties' preparation and litiga58
tion of the case by maintaining a separate position on existing issues
or by adding new claims, parties, or witnesses.5 9 Thus, the existing parties' expectations of an expeditious adjudication and an orderly resolu-

tion of their claims, unobstructed by complexity or confusion, may be
defeated by the delays and complications accompanying intervention.
common concern that the process (procedural law) by which we make our social values (substantive law) authoritative should be fair. We can feel the need for procedure by experiencing the
terror of living without it through reading Kafka's THE TRIAL or by watching a good Hitchcock
film. We can feel the tedium and injustice of too much procedure by reading the first chapter of
Dickens's BLEAK HOUSE. The erection of a bridge of critical examination that extends from our
inchoate sense of fairness to the more tangible world of procedure is a goal toward which all can
contribute. In making this suggestion, I find myself in apparent disagreement with Professor Posner, who seems to suggest that concerns of fairness, which he terms "visceral," are hopelessly
estranged from the process of analyzing the costs and benefits of procedural decisionmaking. R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 334 (2d ed. 1977).

56 "[P]rocedures cannot be 'good' or 'bad' in isolation, without relation to their context." Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 797.
57 See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 512; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 329; 1951
HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 319-20.

58 "Additional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no witnesses of their
own, they are the source of additional questions, objections, briefs, arguments, motions, and the
like which tend to make the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair." Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v.
Manning, Maxwell & Moore, 51 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Mass. 1943). See R. POSNER, supra note
55, at 344.
59 See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1921.
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In addition, the complications resulting from intervention may so strain
the resources of the original parties that their continued ability to participate is jeopardized, and the forum becomes correspondingly less accessible. 60
In times of crowded dockets, the court may also have a concern in
keeping the case from becoming too burdensome and, in the interests
of justice, seeing that the reasonable concerns of existing parties are
protected.6 ' Related are the interests of the original parties and the
court in settling cases, and
the concern that an intervener might effec62
tively block settlement.
Whether these factors should, on balance, defeat intervention depends in part on how they register and combine in a given case. With
reference to each disputed intervention application, such elements of
the case as the litigation resources of the parties, the urgency of the
parties' need to conclude the litigation, the complexity of existing issues, and the press of other matters on the court's docket must be examined. Courts should also seriously consider opportunities provided
by intervention to obtain data making possible a more just or accurate
decision. 63 One cannot generalize. Only a particularized examination
of each case will reveal how existing parties and the court will be
poorly treated if intervention is granted.
The other half of the intervention inquiry must focus on the ques60 As noted in HARVARD Developments, supra note 2, at 902:
Introducing an additional plaintiff or defendant may result in undesirable consequences: it
may introduce an additional party whose participation may result in tactical disadvantages to
the original parties; it may delay and complicate the trial procedurally; and it may lead to
complication and confusion of substantive issues to the prejudice of one or both original
parties.
See Tone & Stifler, Joinder ofPartiesand Consolidationof uliarty Actions, 1967 U. ILL. L.F.
209; 1951 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 320.
61 See 1976 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 1175, concluding: "The court and the judicial
system have an interest in the efficient and fair administration of justice."
62 Opportunities for settlement usually diminish as the number of parties to the litigation increases. See R. POSNER, supra note 55, at 435. An illustration is provided in the examination of
the effect of private intervention in government antitrust proceedings appearing in CHICAGO Note,
supra note 54, at 154.
It should be noted that the consequences of granting intervention are not necessarily adverse
to the court or the existing parties. Intervention may actually enhance the capacity of the court to
determine the rights of existing parties, as when the intervener is able to shed new light on issues
already before the court. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1978); New York Pub. Interest Research
Group, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1975);
General Motors Corp. v. Burns, 50 F.R.D. 401,406 (D. Hawaii 1970); see also Trbovich v. UMW,
404 U.S. 528 (1972).
63 Professors James and Hazard note the existence of a "strong common law tradition that the
judge who conducts the trial should play an active part in directing it so that, within the issues
made by the parties, the true facts of claims and defenses will emerge and the appropriate law be
applied to them." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 6. The same concern should be a
motivating factor in decisions before trial, including the decision whether to grant interventions.
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tion: how poorly treated will the applicant be if intervention is denied?64 The answer turns on the procedural value of accessibilitythus, the question becomes whether it is fair to deny the absentee the
opportunity to influence the litigation, although he will be required to
live with its result. Again, generalizations fall short of providing an
answer. In each case, it is necessary to examine the potential adverse
consequences to the applicant that are the measure of his need to intervene. The examination should consider, inter alia, the precise effects
feared from the litigation, the value or tangibility of interests asserted
to be endangered, the existence and relative desirability of alternative
perhaps the applimeans, if any, to protect the applicant's interest, and
65
cant's financial ability to commence his own suit.
The Needfor a Common Framework.-Thepermutations of possi64 This characterization presumes that the existing parties and the court have other procedural
means of their own to bring the applicant for intervention into the lawsuit if they choose to do so.
This is generally true. See note 5 supra. An exception may exist, however, for the absentee permitted to intervene who also qualifies as "indispensable" under FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). See note 66
in/ra.
If indispensability is the conclusion of the inquiry directed by rule 19(b), the court is required
to dismiss the lawsuit if the indispensable absentee cannot be joined. See California v. Arizona,
440 U.S. 59, 62 & n.3 (1979). Ordinarily, one satisfying rule 24(a) as an intervener of right may
intervene without regard to the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction. See note 171 infra. A
dichotomy arises, however, when an absentee appears capable of satisfying rule 24(a) but also
appears to be an indispensable party incapable of being joined under rule 19. In a number of
decisions, the intervention has not been permitted. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1917
& n.65. Unsuccessful interventions are not without effect in this context since the surfacing of the
unsuccessful applicant provides the court with data requiring dismissal of the suit. Id § 1917
n.66. Yet, dismissal will not always be the result sought by the applicant for intervention, and the
two rules appear to be at odds.
Professor Fraser's resolution of the dichotomy is persuasive. He would have the status of the
intervener settled by applications of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, regardless of the applicant's status under rule 19. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionof FederalCourts ofPersons Whose Interests May be Impaired if Not Joined,62 F.R.D. 483, 483, 485 (1964); see Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1968); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 760. But see
McCoid, 4 Single Packagefor Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 719 n.82 (1976); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1078 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]: "An intervention which is
needed to cure an otherwise fatal defect of parties can scarcely be regarded as ancillary."
To the extent that the "indispensable" absentee can intervene without aborting the lawsuit,
the absentee can add himself to the litigation in a situation where existing parties and the court
would have been without the power to add him by other procedural means. For further discussion of the significance of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to interventions under rule 24, see
text accompanying notes 171-77 infra.
65 The applicant's interest in litigating a claim less expensively as an intervener than would be
possible if he commenced suit on his own is considered a relatively uncompelling reason for granting the application. See, e.g., SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1239 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Carrols Dev. Corp., 454 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). This interest may be critically important, however, when the applicant for intervention has marginal resources and will be unable to afford commencing his own suit. See 1976 HARVARD Note, supra
note 3, at 1184.
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ble factors for and against intervention and the variety of configurations in which they may appear are endless. This article advances the
position that the best federal court intervention rule would subject all
cases to a common framework of decisional criteria that can be
weighed for and against intervention, and authorize a method of variable treatment in intervention decisionmaking. Such a rule would guide
advocates in the preparation of their positions in intervention controversies, and would permit courts to respond to the manifestation of opposing concerns particular to each case.
Such advertent juxtaposition of opposing interests within one decisional framework is exemplified in paragraph (b) of rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 6 Paragraph (b) guides the court in
deciding whether to dismiss or proceed with a suit when a person
whose joinder is required "if feasible" under paragraph (a) of rule 19
cannot be joined. Paragraph (b) reads in part:
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff67will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
66 Rule 19 provides in pertinent part:

Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if(l) m his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall

order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to
venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed
from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described
in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should
be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
67 Id Paragraph (b) was rewritten in the 1966 amendment to the rule. The Advisory Committee stated that the old rule "did not point clearly to the proper basis of decision." Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to Rule 19, FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976). "The
original rule did not state affirmatively what factors were relevant in deciding whether the action
should proceed or be dismissed when joinder of interested persons was infeasible." Id
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The first and third considerations of the rule probe for reasons to dismiss; the second and fourth considerations probe for reasons to continue the action. The court is encouraged to vary the manner and force
with which it applies the considerations in each case and to balance the
results in order to reach a decision. 68 The considerations are intended
to serve as a guide to the court and to permit the court flexibility in
69
weighing the opposing interests in each case.

A similar list of considerations for and against intervention could

be developed for rule 24. Unfortunately, the list of possible concerns

one can extrapolate from the present rule is not complete, 70 and the
concerns that can be found in the rule are not always well-articulated. 7 1
The most serious defect of rule 24, however, is its bifurcation of intervention concerns in order to maintain the separate concepts of intervention of right and permissive intervention. This bifurcation stands in

the way of a common decisional framework for all federal court intervention controversies.
The language of paragraph (a)(2) of rule 24 provides a basis for
the court to gauge any possible prejudice the litigation may cause an
absentee should intervention be denied. 72 But the only means in paragraph (a)(2) for gauging the adverse consequences that may flow from
a grant of intervention is the requirement that applications be
"timely." 73 Thus, under the intervention of right standards of rule 24,

only one-half of the intervention inquiry is provided.
68 See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 365-71.
69 The Supreme Court stated in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson:
The decision whether to dismiss (i.e., the decision whether the person missing is "indispensable") must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing
against opposing interests. Rule 19 does not prevent the assertion of compelling substantive
interests; it merely commands the courts to examine each controversy to make certain that the
interests really exist. To say that a court "must" dismiss in the absence of an indispensable
party and that it "cannot proceed" without him puts the matter the wrong way around: a
court does not know whether a particular person is "indispensable" until it has examined the
situation to determine whether it can proceed without him.
390 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1968).
70 See note 143 and accompanying text infra.
71 See note 144 and accompanying text infra.
72 See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
73 See note 17 and accompanying text supra. The timeliness requirement parallels identical
language at the beginning of (b) of rule 24. Determinations of timeliness are generally committed to the discretion of the trial court. There has been some pressure felt to read the timeliness
requirement more sympathetically if the requirements of I (a)(2) are otherwise satisfied than if the
application was made under (b)(2). COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 928-29. See Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907-08 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But the more frequently held and probably more sensible view is that decisions on the timeliness of I (a)(2) interventions are also committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., United States v.
Marion County Sch. Dist., 590 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1979); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550
F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Paynter, 118 Ariz. 470, 471, 577
P.2d 1089, 1090 (Ct. App. 1978); Bryant v. Lake County Trust Co., 334 N.E.2d 730, 735 (Ind. Ct.
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By contrast, under the permissive intervention provision of the

rule, the district court is encouraged to consider in its discretion the
possibility that "the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the ad-

judication of the rights of the original parties. '74 Prior to the 1966
amendment to the rule, some balancing was possible under paragraph
(b)(2) between this admonitory language and the need of the absentee

to intervene. 75 Upon the expansion of intervention of right by the

App. 1975). Prior to these decisions, Arizona and Indiana had adopted intervention rules with
language substantially similar to federal rule 24. See note 14 supra.
The timeliness requirement probably reflects a traditional bias against late interventions. See
Levi & Moore, supra note 2, at 904. See United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432
(C.D. Cal. 1967), afft'dsub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968)
(per curiam); NLRB v. Shortenda Steaks, Inc., 424 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1970). Delay alone is an
insufficient means for determining timeliness, however, especially if inadequacy of representation
by existing parties is suggested only by events occurring at or after trial. United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 432 (1977); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See
Penick v. Columbus Educ. Ass'n, 574 F.2d 889, 891 (6th Cir. 1978), where denial of intervention
was affirmed, but the court added. "Our decision is reached without prejudice to the right of the
[applicant] to seek intervention at a later date should it become apparent that [its] interests are not
being adequately represented in further proceedings before the district court."
In exercising its discretion to determine whether an intervention under I (a) or (b) is timely,
the court will consider whether the delay in applying for intervention will create prejudice and
whether the applicant had a reasonable opportunity to apply earlier. See Alaniz v. Titie Lewis
Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 937 (1978); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp.,
427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
On timeliness under rule 24 generally, see Note, The Requirement of Timeliness UnderRule 24
of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,37 VA. L. REv. 863 (1951).
In addition to the timeliness requirement, some have viewed the (a)(2) requirement that the
applicant prove the possibility of inadequate representation as another measure to protect against
prejudice from granting intervention. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 403; COLUMBIA Note, supra note
12, at 924. In the broadest sense, this may be true. Any prerequisite for intervention contained in
the rule reduces the number of potential interventions, and all interventions carry with them some
costs to the existing parties and the court. See note 58 supra. But the inadequacy requirement
seems plainly intended to aid the court in that part of the intervention equation dealing with the
need of the applicant to intervene rather than to serve as a criterion for measuring prejudice if the
intervention is granted. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 343; notes 106 & 107 infra. Paragraph
(a)(2) lacks a hook on which the party opposing intervention can hang an argument of prejudice.
This is consistent with the concept and tradition underlying intervention of right. See note 17
supra. The only means available from the rule to measure adverse consequences from a I (a)(2)
intervention is language at the beginning of (a) that conditions rights of intervention "upon
timely application." See note 13 supra.
74 See note 13 supra. The applicant under (a)(2) may place his case beyond the reach of an
assessment of general costs to existing parties and the court possible from the intervention. This is
because of the tradition associated with intervention of right and the mandatory language of the
paragraph. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra; note 15 supra.
75 While the primary purpose of permissive intervention under I (b) has been to achieve judical economy, see HARVARD Developments, supra note 2, at 903, prior to the amendment it was
also seen as a means of protecting interests of the absentee not strictly within the language of
subparagraphs (2) and (3) of (a). See also COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 927. The interest
of the applicant in the outcome of the suit was combined with considerations of judicial economy
to justify intervention under (b)(2), see, e.g., Cutler v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 34 F.R.D.
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 34 F.
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amendment, however, applicants with a cognizable practical need to
intervene began to choose the more tactically favorable ground of paragraph (a)(2) for their applications. 76 Paragraph (b)(2) was relegated to
applications based on judicial economy. Consequently, it is only
of
against interventions justified on this limited basis that the concerns
77
delay and prejudice in paragraph (b)(2) are brought into play.
As a result of this bifurcation, the full range of decisional criteria
in the rule cannot be activated at the same time. The judge who wishes
to consider interests both for and against intervention must consider
two separate applications, and even then there is no provision for a
balancing of interests. Paragraph (a)(2) directs the judge to consider
the need of the absentee to intervene, but does not authorize him to
balance that need against the potential adverse consequences of intervention, except insofar as such consequences are attributable to an untimely application. Paragraph (b)(2) requires the judge to consider the
possible adverse consequences from intervention of prejudice and delay to original parties, but the results of this measurement can be used
as a basis to deny only those applications to intervene that are argued
on a theory of judicial economy.
Notwithstanding the bifurcated decisionmaking structure of rule
24, a few courts have considered the possible adverse consequences
from granting timely interventions under paragraph (a)(2). The incentive to do so became especially strong after the 1966 amendment when
the range of interests capable of supporting intervention of right became so broad 78 that it was no longer difficult to conceive of situations
(b)(2) intervention even when
Supp. 594 (D. Wis. 1940), or was even capable of supporting
judicial economy would not be served. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 3 10 U.S.
434 (1940).
76 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1911. But see Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 50 F.R.D. 251, 259 (N.D. Miss. 1970), cerf. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972) (combining judicial
economy and the desire of the applicant to avoid stare decisisconsequences from the suit to justify
(b)(2) intervention).
77 As the court in Stallworth v. Monsanto Co. observed:
Whether allowing intervention will delay the progress of the case or prejudice the rights of
the original parties is a factor which the district court must consider in exercising its discretion to permit intervention under section (b) of rule 24. . . .Since a similar provision is not
included in section (a) of the rule, it is apparent that prejudice to the existing parties other
than that caused by the would-be intervener's failure to act promptly was not a factor meant
to be considered where intervention was sought under section (a).
558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977). For a similar interpretation prior to the 1966 amendment, see
International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J.,
concurring). In support of the conclusion that general concerns of prejudice from timely interventions are relegated to consideration of applications under (b), see also Cohn, supra note 2, at
1232; HARVARD Developments, supra note 2, at 902; PENNSYLVANIA Comment, supra note 2, at
542-43.
78 For an examination of interests that may now be recognized as supporting intervention of
right, see notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the nature and purpose of
the textual alterations of nonstatutory intervention of right in the 1966 amendment that made
expansion possible, see notes 106-09 and accompanying text infra.
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where the costs from intervention would outweigh the applicant's need
to intervene. 7 9 The courts that balance interests under the present rule

may do more justice to the parties before them, but they create decisions that are troublesome in that they distort the plain meaning and
function 8° of the rule. Some courts have expanded the timeliness requirement of the rule from a measure of the prejudice resulting from a

delayed application to prejudice per se. 8 1 Other courts, more improbably, have used the requirements that the absentee may not be adequately represented 82 or that he will be practically impaired by the
outcome of the lawsuit83 to support an examination of possible
prejudice to the parties if intervention of right is granted. Such distortions of the rule call to mind the importance of the craftsman's motto

for selecting a tool appropriate to the task at hand: if the wrong tool is
selected, the task may be done poorly and the tool may be damaged for
its subsequent intended use.
Tradition, the text of the rule, and most scholarly explications of it
suggest that the concept of intervention of right is incompatible with an
approach to intervention decisionmaking that weighs the interests of all

principals.8 4 However undesirable this may be, many courts will sim-

79 Circumstances where the burdens created by interventions of right outweighed the values of
intervention occurred even under the more limited form of original (a)(2). See note 40 supra.
Expansion of the concept of being "bound" led commentators to conclude correctly that invocation of intervention of right deprived courts of the authority to balance costs to existing parties
from the intervention against the benefit to the applicant from being able to intervene. HARVARD
Developments, supra note 2, at 902; Note, Intervention and the Meaning of "Bound" Under Federal
Rule 24(a)(2), 63 YALE L.J. 408, 414 (1954) [hereinafter cited as YALE Note].
80 The meaning and function of these standards are summarized elsewhere. Timeliness, see
note 73 supra; adequacy of representation, see notes 106 & 107 infra; interest, see notes 105 & 106
infra.
81 See Moten v. Bricklayers Int'l Union, 543 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also McClain
v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977).
82 See Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1976); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamlifters Local 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1975). For further criticism of
this misuse of (a)(2), see note 73 supra.
83 See United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975): "The issue of'practical
impairment' is necessarily one of degree . . . . It requires . . . a consideration of the competing
interests of the plaintiff and defendant in conducting and concluding their lawsuit without undue
complication and of the public in the speedy and economical resolution of legal controversies."
Id at 1150-51.
84 The author of a recent law review note reached a contrary conclusion, stating that "[t]he
commentators who have discerned in rule 24(a) a requirement that all interests be weighed appear
to be correct." 1976 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 1175 n.3 (citing 3B J. MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE $ 24.09-1 [1] (1975); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1902 (1972); Cohn, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedur4 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1232
(1966). But see International Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 865 (2d Cir.
1962) (Hays, J., concurring); Comment, The Litigant and the Absentee in FederalMultiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 531, 542-43 (1968)). The statements of the commentators cited by the
author, however, are unsupported by cases and inconclusive at best.
The reference of the author of the note to Professor Cohn's article is puzzling. It may be
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ply refuse to consider adverse
terventions until the rule is
procedure, the rule should be
tervention controversies of all

consequences from paragraph (a)(2) inchanged.8 5 In the interests of a fair
amended to allow a balancing in all inconcerns for and against intervention.

The Importance of Clear Criteriain Rule 24
One generally accepted principle of modern procedure has been

that the criteria for procedural decisionmaking should be clear and
gleaned easily from the civil rules themselves. Case law expertise was
probably never widespread among members of the bar during the period of common law pleading and procedure. 86 This created an unfair
element of risk for the party in selecting his attorney. 87 Even those
conversant with appellate opinions found them to be uncertain reposi-

tories of procedural rules, 8 and questions over the nature and applica-

based on Professor Cohn's observation that only time will tell whether existing parties and the
courts will be without protection from the expansion of $ (a)(2) by the 1966 amendment. See
Cohn, supra note 2, at 1232. But, on the same page, Professor Cohn writes, "[T]he concept of
intervention as of right carries with it an implicit judgment that justice demands that the first
interest should predominate over the other two." Id.
The author's citation to MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE focuses on material recompiled by
Professor Moore in collaboration with Professor Kennedy. The material bears acknowledged resemblance to Professor Kennedy's intervention article. See Kennedy, note 2 supra. One finds in
the cited material the observation that "the interests of the original parties and the interest of
judicial administration are also at stake in every intervention case." 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 18, 24.09-111]. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 344. Professors Moore and Kennedy acknowledge that (a)(2) "speaks only to an analysis of the interests of the applicant for
intervention," but argue by analogy to FED. R. Civ. P. 19 that interests of existing parties and the
court will be accounted for. Id Earlier in the same paragraph, however, it is said that "as the
absolute right of the applicant for intervention is expanded, the rights of original parties to control
the litigation are diminished." Id.
The portion of the Wright and Miller treatise cited by the author notes the separation of
interventions by
(a) and (b) of rule 24 and suggests that
the distinction is neither as clearcut nor as important as the usual statement of it would suggest. Applicants often will rely alternatively on both subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) and
it is not at all uncommon for a court to hold that intervention will be allowed without specifying which branch of the rule it considers to be on point.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1902. Some labor is required to derive from this language support for the conclusion that the interests of all principals will be weighed in I (a)(2)
decisionmaking, especially when Professors Wright and Miller observe on the same page: "Subdivision (a) represents a judgment that in the situations there described justice demands that the
interest of the absentee should predominate over the interests of the original parties and of trial
convenience ...
" Id
85 The issue was squarely presented in Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir.
1977). The court held that prejudice to existing parties not attributable to a delay in the application for intervention was a concern entirely outside (a) of rule 24. Id at 267. Portions of the
opinion appear in notes 17 & 77 supra.
86 C. CLARK, supra note 14, at 54-55.
87 Id
88 Later, four years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally adopted, Dean

Clark wrote:

916
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tion of procedural case law sometimes assumed proportions that made

procedure an end rather than a means in litigation. 89 Progress was
made first through code reforms and later, more extensively, through

the modem civil rules, by surveying the interests at stake in particular
procedural disputes and posing them as decisional standards within the
rule. 90 Ideally, one should be able to read the rule governing a particular procedural controversy and understand what interests are entitled
to recognition and how they ought to be weighed. Rules cannot be self-

applying,9 1 but they are likely to work most efficiently and fairly when

there is a minimal need to rely on case authority.
The procedural values presented previously9 2 would be best advanced if this principle was reflected in the text and application of the

civil rule governing interventions. Knowledge of the criteria by which
intervention decisions will be made would generally be clearer and

more manageable when collected in the rule itself than when available
through extrapolations from judicial doctrine. 93 Knowledge would be
more uniformly accessible to attorneys for appraising and preparing
their cases, whether they urge or oppose the application for interven-

tion; the procedure itself would therefore be more accessible. A functional and relatively self-contained rule diminishes both the
One should not be misled by the number of decisions upon the rules. That so many precedents seem available is due in part to the enterprise of law publishers, with their various
editions of rules decisions, and in part to the desire of the judges themselves toparticipate in
the new movement. Nevertheless these decisions in the main reiterate the broad authority of
the rules themselves, and are not really necessary for a correct interpretation of the new system.
See Clark, supra note 1, at 522.
89 See generally C. CLARK, supra note 14, at 28. Cf. Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules
of Court, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 204 (1937) ("Whenever a rule operates to prevent bringing. . . a
dispute promptly to an issue it ought to be abolished.").
90 This approach implies rejection of the use in procedural codes or rules of language that
depends heavily upon judicial interpretation. Writing of reforms needed in the New York Civil
Practice Act of 1920, Dean Clark observed that revision should not
mean simply the transfer of the present provisions from the statutes to the rules. Improvement in the statement of the provisions themselves is most desirable. It is only an unsubstantial dream to think that constant attempts at definition have made these provisions clear, they
merely served to make the blindness of the provisions more apparent. The original framers
of the code desired to lay down rigid rules that would leave nothing to discretion and the
operation of which could always be definitely foretold. Even in taking over equity principles
of convenience and flexibility, they attempted a precise statement with a seemingly definite
content, as in the case ofjoinder of parties and of actions. This was most unfortunate, as it
has turned out in practice. It does not seem possible to apply mechanical rules to pleading,
where the enforcement of such rules is not the endin view in the litigation. The terms used by
the codifiers proved hopelessly indefinite. The rules may be refrained to indicate the purpose
sought to be achieved. They may give the guidingprinciple to the court, but this must be
worked out by the court itself, and a large measure of discretion is necessary.
C. CLARK, supra note 14, at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
91 Cf. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6 (1949) ("It is only folklore which
holds that a statute if clearly written can be completely unambiguous and applied as intended to a
specific case.").
92 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
93 See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

uncertainty of procedural case law94 and the prospect that the meaning
of the rule will be revised by review in each new case. Confinement of
decisional criteria to the rule itself would thus make intervention procedure more expeditious and less likely to obscure the merits of the case.
In 1966, the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
approached the task of amending rules 19, 23, and 24 with the spirit of
reform suggested by this analysis. They intended to follow Judge
Clark's admonitions to "shy away as much as possible from abstractions" 95 and to draft rules that, by their content, would guide the court
in understanding the rules and their application. 96 There is substantial
feeling that this goal was realized in the amendment to rule 24,97 and
that the rule has worked well since. 98 A closer examination, however,
suggests that the work of the draftsmen remains unfinished, and that
the success of rule 24 as a stable and flexible decisionmaking tool has
been exaggerated.
The circumstances of the 1966 amendment to rule 24 have already
been described. 99 The original rule contained formalistic references to
possibilities that the absentee might be "bound," or might have an interest in "property" within control of the court.1°° Application of the
rule depended on the extrinsic judicial meanings that had becorfie attached to these terms. This cultivated a continued dependence on case
law, and the case law was not clear.' 0 ' The 1966 amendment to rule 24
was laudable in that it purged the rule of these terms and presented a
new description of interests capable of supporting intervention, which
is both practical in terms 0 2 and close to the roots of the historic purpose of the device.' 0 3 Paragraph (a)(2) provides the court with thought94 Id

95 Clark, supra note 24, at 501.
96 Professor Cohn described the revision of the three rules as "a restructuring of major proportions to eliminate formalistic labels that restricted many courts from an examination of the practical factors of individual cases." Cohn, supra note 2, at 1204.
97 Id at 1229; PENNSYLVANIA Comment, supra note 2, at 554-55.
98 See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1903.

99 See notes 39-49 and accompanying text supra.
10 For the text of the original rule, see note 34 supra.
101 A number of decisions appeared to read the original T (a)(2) to require that the absentee run
a risk of being bound in a res judicata sense. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683 (1961); Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951). See generally 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 18, § 1907 n.92. Other decisions expanded the concept of "being bound" to
include the possibility of harm in a practical sense. See note 40 supra. Similarly, some decisions
appeared to confine the reach of original (a)(3) to absentees interested in property actually
within control of the court. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951). See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1907 n.98. Other courts extended the category to
absentees who might suffer damage to a tangible property interest as a result of the litigation. See
note 41 supra.
102 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
103 See note 6 supra. Professor Berger describes the "prevention of harm to third persons" as
the "animaiing principle of intervention." Berger, supra note 3, at 69.
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ful and fairly complete criteria for determining whether the applicant
needs to intervene. First, is there an "interest" held by the absentee
that "as a practical matter" may be impaired? 04 In other words, can
the absentee be hurt by the outcome of the lawsuit? 105 Second, is there
at least a possibility that the absentee's interest will not be "adequately
represented by existing parties;" 10 6 that is, is it possible that none of the
existing parties will go as far in their own representation as would be
required to represent fairly the interests of the absentee in the out104 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). According to the full text of this portion of the rule, the standard
is met "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." Id. It seems artificial to separate the
concept of the absentee's interest from the possibility of impairment of the interest by the litigation, and it is not profitable to treat interest and impairment as tests that must be satisfied separately.
The effect of this part of the amendment has been to increase substantially the number of
cases within the concept of intervention of right. Cohn, supra note 2, at 1232. See, e.g., Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178-81 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1967). But see Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 154 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Kaplan, supra note 2, at 405.
1o5 Attempts have been made at more exacting definitions in order to establish the minimum
stake the absentee must have in the outcome. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531
(1971) ("a significantly protectable interest"); Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784, 786 (10th Cir.
1967) ("a specific legal or equitable interest"); Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1968),
rev'd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("a direct, substantial, legally
protectable interest in the proceedings"). As one court observed correctly, however, "[Tihe
amendments made the question of what constitutes an 'interest' more visible without contributing
an answer." Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d at 178. An uncertain definition of the absentee's interest
in relation to the lawsuit seems appropriate. "The range of possible interests may defy adequate
classification, spreading over a spectrum that is extremely hard to chart." Shapiro, supra note 2, at
740. Accord, 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 18, § 1908; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 346,349-52.
Attempts by courts to impose a narrower meaning are likely to produce "significant contradictions
and confusion in the case law." 1976 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at 1176 & n.10.
106 The 1966 amendment changed the adequate representation provision in the original rule in
two ways. First, adequate representation could bar any nonstatutory claim for intervention of
right after the amendment, see note 13 supra, while I (a)(3) of the original rule permitted intervention of right without reference to the question of representation by existing parties, see note 34
supra. This change did not really broaden the restrictive effect of the inadequacy requirement,
since (a)(3) interveners were, by definition, without representation. See note 107 infra. The
second change was in the wording of the adequate representation provision as it had appeared in
the original version of I (a)(2). See note 34 supra. The effect of this change may have been to
place the burden on the parties opposing intervention to demonstrate that the representation by
existing parties was adequate, Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967), and to minimize applicant's hurdles. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972); R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN
& K. CLERMONT, supra note 44, at 1005. But see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 155-56 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.
Supp. 1289, 1337 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The number of recent cases denying intervention on the basis
of adequate representation, however, suggests the requirement is still formidable. See, e.g.,
McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 486 (3d Cir. 1979); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579
F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978); Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978); Blanchard v.
Johnson, 532 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 869 (1976).
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come? 10 7 As they appear in the rule, neither "interest" nor the idea of
adequate representation suggests precise categories of application. The
meanings of the terms are uncertain, although this uncertainty may
have been intended by the draftsmen in order to compel courts to address the particular circumstances of each case when answering the
question of intervention.10 8 And it seems unlikely that the confusion
under the amended rule is any greater than that under its predecessor. 109

The problem is that the draftsmen did not go far enough. Instead
of entirely revising rule 24, 10 they simply affixed their pragmatic criteria for measuring intervention need to the concept of intervention of
107 The concern of adequate representation is closely tied to the concern of the applicant's
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 343; Shapiro, supra note 2, at
748.
For situations that are contemporary survivors of I (a)(3) of the original rule, see note 53
supra, the answer posed in the text can quickly be answered in the affirmative. All existing parties
will be claimants of property subject to the control of the court in competition with the applicant
for intervention. The applicant's interest will be entirely unrepresented. Cohn, supra note 2, at
1231 n. 113. The difficult cases are those where the applicant for intervention seeks to have the
litigation conclude in the same way as does an existing party, see, e.g., notes 51, 52 & 54 and
accompanying text supra, and that party does not appear to be in collusion with the other side or
to lack adversary competence. If the existing party has less to lose by an adverse result in the case
than the applicant, then that party is not as likely to be as tenacious in spending money on the
case, resisting settlement, taking appeals, and the like as the applicant would be in protecting his
interest, and thus should be permitted to intervene. See Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d
22, 27-28 (8th Cir. 1957). On the other hand, if the existing party's stake in the outcome is commensurate with or greater than that of the applicant, then the applicant should not be permitted to
intervene under (a)(2). See Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.
1970).
108 See notes 95 & 96 supra. Another way of looking at it would be to see in the approach of
the draftsmen postponement of the decision about what rule 24 would mean until it was applied in
the particular circumstances of each case. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 20, at 156-57.
109 See note 101 supra. Cf. Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 582-88 (1936 discussion of interest
showing confusion in interpretation of original rule).
110 It might be interesting to speculate why the revision of rule 24 did not match in scope the
companion revisions of rules 19 and 23. Professor Kennedy wrote:
The main thrust of the 1966 amendments focused on Rules 19 and 23. Once their revision
was accepted, the revision of Rule 24 was a necessary consequence. . . . It is too early to
evaluate the operation of the new Rule. However, a theoretical criticism may be raised that
the amendment of Rule 24 did not remain totally faithful to the revision theory of new Rules
19 and 23. That theory is that the rules should express factors for decision rather than definitional categories.
Kennedy, supra note 2, at 374. The draftsmen apparently intended that the gap in relative development between rules 19 and 24 would be at least partly filled by using rule 19 by analogy in
intervention decisionmaking. Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to rule 24, FED.
R. Civ. P. 24, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976). Subparagraph (a)(2)(i) of rule 19 does contain language
nearly identical to T (a)(2) of rule 24. The helpfulness of the analogy, however, is questionable.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at
514-15; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 757-58. But see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d
818, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1967); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 405.

74:894 (1980)

QuestioningIntervention of Right

right in paragraph (a)(2). This created two basic problems for decisionmaking under the rule.
The first problem, discussed previously,"1 ' is that a court became

required to conduct a searching examination of the possible need of the
applicant to intervene, but was not authorized to consider the adverse
consequences of granting the intervention, except insofar as they might
be attributable to an untimely filing. The second problem is that the
rule draws federal appellate courts into the vortex of intervention controversies. As the courts of appeals have routinely become more involved in intervention controversies, there has emerged an increasing

body of case law" 12 that cannot be ignored in resolving future controversies. This limits the procedural ends that rule 24 could otherwise
serve if the standards for intervention decisionmaking were clear from
the rule itself.

The limited value of case law as a guide for intervention decisionmaking becomes clear when one considers the appropriate role of ap-

pellate courts. By tradition, courts generally explain their decisions by
referring to a ratio decidendi-a governing rule intended both to explain and to authoritatively direct the result in that case and in other

factually similar cases. 1 3 The central function of an appellate court is
to review the soundness of the trial court's selection of a ratio
decidendi.1'4 The trial court's decision about the governing rule that is

III See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
112 Caseload pressures on federal courts of appeals have resulted in the adoption of internal
measures that make it impossible to assume that a published opinion will accompany every decision. At least three circuits have adopted rules that permit decisions without opinion. Hearingsof
the Commission on Revision ofthe FederalCourtAppellate System 451 n.3 (1974) (statement of the

Seventh Federal Circuit Bar Ass'n). All circuits have rendered unpublished decisions, and at least
nine have adopted rules barring citation of unpublished opinions or orders. Id. at 526-27. Statistics for the first 11 months of 1973 reveal that less than half of federal circuit decisions fall into the
unpublished category. Id. at 526. The practice of deciding cases in federal circuit courts without
published opinions has been forcefully criticized. P. CARRINOTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-39 (1976). The result of the trend appears to be to complicate rather

than reduce dependence on federal appellate case law.
113 See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 56-57 (rev. ed. 1954);

Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 643 ("the constraint of consistency").
The relationship and governing effect of the ratio decidendi, even on like cases is, of course,
limited. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 20, at 139; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S.
126, 132-33 (1944).
It is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the light of
the facts of the case under discussion. To keep opinions within reasonable bounds precludes
writing into them every limitation or variation which might be suggested by the circumstances of cases not before the court. General expressions transposed to other facts are often
misleading.
Id. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally Gellhorn, ContractsandPublicPolicy, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 679, 690-91 (1935).

114 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 646 (appellate court decides whether it agrees with trial
court's resolution of legal issue).
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most appropriate to the facts of the case may be thoughtful and one

with which we agree, but it should be open to appellate redecision. Appellate courts have a responsibility to see that the rules used to decide
controversies are applied appropriately and uniformly. 115 They have
the power to generalize authoritatively about the types of factual situa-

tions or relationships that ought to be affected by the rule. Appellate
redecision, then, is a means of rectifying inappropriate applications of
the rule and of making and enforcing precedent to advance the court's
interpretation of the rule. This is the essence of the appellate judicial
116
process in the federal courts.
The procedural costs of appeals' 17 may be substantial. These costs
must be balanced against the institutional importance of redecision.
Procedural costs also may be in a sense offset by the settling effect the
appellate court's decision has on future controversies concerning the
meaning of the governing rule." 18 Intervention controversies, however,
cannot be resolved with reference to a rule of general application. The
case to case permutations and varying configurations of concerns for
and against intervention" l9 make these controversies rule-resistant.
The circumstances that serve as a basis for decision are so varied and
random that the court would virtually need to create a new rule to desupra note 112, at 2-3.
116 The lawmaking function of the United States Supreme Court cannot be doubted. Betten,
InstitutionalReform in the FederalAppellate Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63, 68 (1976). See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 112, at 210-11. Federal courts of appeal also
have a substantial lawmaking function. This was probably an acknowledged factor in the somewhat controversial legislation creating federal courts of appeals. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LAN115 p. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG,

DIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 258 (1928). The importance of the lawmaking

function grew thereafter. "The Supreme Court is no longer capable of providing the supervision
of federal judicial law making that it once provided." Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts ofAppeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82 HARV. L. REV.
542, 553 (1969). Federal courts of appeals have consequently developed "the ability to create and
to balkanize national law." Betten, supra, at 68. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra, at

258-59; Howard, Litigation Flow in Three United States Courts ofAppeals, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
33, 50 (1973).
117 Costs from the process of taking an appeal maybe measured in several ways. For Professor
Carrington's survey of elements contributing to the cost of appeals to the parties, which he states is
"expensive," see Carrington, supra note 116, at 567.
While the Supreme Court "has managed to keep completely current in its disposition of the
workload," R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 43 (5th ed. 1978), federal

courts of appeals have not. In fact, the rapid rise in filings and resultant overcrowding of the
dockets of federal courts of appeals has been described as a crisis. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 31-33 (1973); Carrington, note 116 supra.

118 See R. POSNER, supra note 55, at 422. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision
in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), holding that suits brought in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) were not subject to the restraint of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976), or its decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), that federal
common law provided a remedy in admiralty for wrongful death.
119 See text accompanying notes 27-56 supra.
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20
scribe each case.'
It is therefore apparent that appellate redecision of intervention
controversies will rarely be warranted. Because review of intervention

denials is not within the federal appellate court's regime of rule elaboration and enforcement, the only question that can be reviewed is
whether the trial court did "justice" in the particular case. 12 1 Except in
the occasional outrageous case, the benefits of appellate review based

on this standard do not justify the costs inherent in appeal. 122 More
important, because the decision must be pegged to criteria in paragraph
(a)(2) for establishing intervention need, and because interv6ntion con-

troversies are inherently lacking in material for a ratio decidendi, the

settling effect of federal appellate case law on new intervention controversies is questionable. Even the most interesting and thoughtful of the
federal appellate decisions 23 are valuable more for the methodological
example they set for district court judges than for any new light they
shed on the meaning of rule 24. Many other decisions, especially those
of the United States Supreme Court, reflect an attitude that rule 24 is a
mechanism for reaching' 24 or avoiding 25 other issues raised on appeal.
120 Findings of fact provide another, more commonplace example of rule-resistant decisionmaking. Where, for example, the trial court, sitting without a jury, hears evidence concerning the
disability and diminished earning capacity of,Aas the result of an automobile accident, it would
be improper for the court to generalize from its past observations of other injured plaintiffs as to
what A's damages should be. The court can rationally explain how it evaluated the evidence in
A's case to determine his damages and can even call its decision "the rule of.A." The concept of a
governing rule in this context is meaningless, however, since A's case will never come up again.
See generally Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 662.
121 See M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMIT & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (3d ed. 1976). But see Carrington, The Powerof DistrictJudges

and the Responsibility of Courts of 4ppeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969). See generally Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-80 (1957).
"[T]o come to the very'heart of the issue, is there any reason to suppose that the result an
appellate court reaches... is more likely to be 'just' than was the opposite result reached by the
trial court?" Wright, supra, at 781. Professor Wright was not directing his statement to intervention review, but the point would seem to apply. A case may produce circumstances where it is
both unjust to grant intervention and unjust to deny it, creating the kind of dilemma aptly described by Professor Rosenberg as "right against right." Rosenberg, supra note 55, at 797.
122 See note 117 supra.
123 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967). These cases have been discussed extensively elsewhere. Regarding the
4tlantis case, see Kaplan, supra note 2, at 407; Kennedy, supra note 2, at 344; DUKE Note, supra
note 51. Regarding the Smuck case, see 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1908; Note,
Interventionas ofRight on
FederalRule of Civil Procedure24(a)(2) andthe "'nterest"Necessaryfor
Appeal, 1969 DUKE L.J. 821.
Significantly, the court in Smuck refused to find precise meaning in the 1966 amendment, 408
F.2d at 178, and the court in .4tlantis recommended that the amendment be individually tailored
to future controversies, 379 F.2d at 829.
124 Three Supreme Court cases offer examples. Each reveals manipulation of rule 24 to reach
other issues on appeal and has been justly criticized. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1967), criticizedin Kaplan, supra note 2, at 403-07; Kaufman v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, 343 U.S. 156,
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The results in these cases may be understandable as expedients,1 26 but
they undermine the meaning and authority of rule 24.127
ELIMINATING NONSTATUTORY INTERVENTION OF RIGHT

Thus far, this article has suggested that the structure and method
of intervention decisionmaking that is most realistically calculated to
produce good procedure in a jurisprudential sense is one that subjects
all interventi6n controversies to a common framework of decisional
criteria that is clearly articulated in the rule itself and can be administered with minimal dependence on case law. This can be achieved,
however, only if intervention decisionmaking is committed to the discretion of the district courts, with limited opportunity for appellate
court redetermination. Taken together, these proposed elements of

methodology suggest the abolition of nonstatutory intervention of right
in rule 24.
The reasons for reducing the role played by federal appellate
judges in intervention decisionmaking may already be evident. First,
the only means by which rule 24 can categorize and designate some
intervention denials for redecision on appeal 128 is through a bifurcation
of decisional criteria. This bifurcation is an inevitable consequence of
the maintenance of intervention of right as a discrete concept in rule 24.
This means that the full range of intervention criteria present in the
rule cannot be activated at the same time. 29 Second, federal appellate
opinions, which are a byproduct of redecision, have obscured deci161-62 (1952), criticizedin YALE Note, supra note 79, at 411 n.19; SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co.; 310 U.S. 434, 458-60 (1940), criticizedin 1976 HARVARD Note, supra note 3, at
324-25.
125 In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527-30 (1971), the Supreme Court contracted
the meaning of rule 24 as one ground for preventing the appellant from challenging investigative
proceedings of the Internal Revenue Service. This case has also been justly criticized. 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1908.
126 In the three cases described in note 124 supra, the Supreme Court vindicated substantive
rights claimed by the successful intervener that it considered to be of national importance. See
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 136 (1967) ("to see that [the
Court's] mandate is carried out"); Kaufman v. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, 343 U.S. 156, 158 (1952) ("an important question of the power of the Alien
Property Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act"); SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448 (1940) ("considerations growing out of the public policy of
the [Bankruptcy] Act").
127 "[A]ny attempt to extrapolate from Cascade or from Donaldson, and to deduce from those
cases rules applicable to ordinary private litigation, is fraught with great risks." 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 18, § 1908.
On the general tendency of appellate courts to manipulate procedure to reach a desired substantive end and its adverse effects, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 3; Clark, supra
note 14, at 163-64.
128 See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
129 See notes 72, 73 & 77 and accompanying text supra.
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sional standards for intervention under rule 24(a)(2). 13o
The role of federal appellate judges can be significantly reduced
by a rule that commits all decisionmaking with reference to nonstatu32
tory1 3 1 interventions to the sound discretion of the district courts.'
The individualized approach to decisionmaking necessary to resolve
intervention controversies provides an appropriate occasion for conferring such discretion. 33 Discretionary decisionmaking is already wellestablished with reference to permissive interventions under paragraph
(b)(2)134 of rule 24, and the thinking that is presently required for individualized decisionmaking under paragraph (a)(2) has been described,
135
accurately, as a kind of a sub rosa discretionary phenomenon.
Under the formulation of rule 24 proposed in this article, the standard of review in appeals from denials of intervention should be
whether the denial was an abuse of discretion. This would change
what appears now to be an obligation of appellate courts to redecide
denials of paragraph (a)(2) intervention applications 136 into an acknowledgment of the authority to review, but with a request in the rule
for self-restraint. 137 Appellate courts would be expected to accept the
trial court's denial of intervention unless that decision was palpably
unjust, 13 8 or the trial court, in deciding the case, failed to follow the
130 See notes 82-84, 107, 124 & 128 and accompanying text supra.
131 While statutory interventions lead something of a separate life from their nonstatutory
counterparts in rule 24, see note 12 supra, it is at least arguable that statutory intervention of right
could also be abolished by amending rule 24 so as to make such statutes "in conflict with" the new
rule and thus "of no further force or effeci." See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 1
am not prepared to suggest that this would be desirable. Whether particular federal substantive
law creates idiosyncratic procedural needs that must be accommodated outside the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is an interesting question, but one beyond the scope of this article.
132 For an explanation of how discretion functions to insulate trial decisions from appellate
redecision, see note 20 supra.
133 "Almost all of the problems ofjurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and
discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less
trained intuition of experienced magistrates." R. POUND, supra note 113, at 54.
The rule, mechanically applied, works by repetition and precludes individuality in results.
On the other hand, in the handmade as distinguished from the machine-made product,
the specialized skill of the workman gives us something infinitely more subtle than can be
expressed in rules. In law some situations call for the product of hands, not of machines, for
they involve not repetition, where the general elements are significant, but unique events, in
which the special circumstances are significant.
Id. at 70. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 409 (1949); Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 662.
134 See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 659; note 22 supra. District court decisions granting intervention are usually considered discretionary as well. See note 20 supra.
135 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 758.
136 See notes 15, 23 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
137 In other words, the standard for review of discretionary decisionmaking under the present
rule 24 would apply. See notes 20-23 supra.
138 It is likely that courts will also continue to manipulate intervention review in order to reach
other issues. See notes 124 & 126 supra. But, as exercises of discretionary authority, neither
manipulative appellate decisions, nor those under an inchoate "justice" standard, would be as
likely to haunt subsequent cases as precedent.
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decisional methodology outlined in the rule.1 39
The drafting necessary to amend rule 24 would not be difficult.
Nonstatutory intervention of right could simply be eliminated, and
cases now falling within paragraph (a)(2) could be consolidated with
nonstatutory permissive interventions under paragraph (b)(2). One of
a series of amendments to rule 24 proposed by Professor Shapiro would
broaden substantially the category of cases committed to trial court discretion consistent with this analysis. t40 While Professor Shapiro appears to disagree with the conclusion of this article that all nonstatutory
intervention of right should be abolished,' 4 ' the language he has proposed nonetheless illustrates how a complete abolition could be accomplished. He suggests the following amendment to rule 24:
The factors to be considered by the court in exercising its discretion...
include, where relevant: (1) the nature and extent of the applicant's interest in the subject matter of the action and the degree to which the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest; (2) the adequacy of the representation of the appli139 As Professor Rosenberg states:
To play fair, a trial judge relying upon discretionary power should place on the record the
circumstances and factors that were crucial to his determination. He should spell out his
reasons as well as he can so that counsel and the reviewing court will know and be in a
position to evaluate the soundness of his decision.
Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 665-66.
At present, federal trial judges are not required to make findings and conclusions when adjudicating motions to intervene. FED. R. Civ. P. 52. See Edmonson v. Nebraska ex rel. Meyer, 383
F.2d 123, 126 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1967). But see Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1973).
On the other hand, circuit courts have been willing to consider on review whether criteria in the
rule elaborating the trial court's present discretion were utilized. Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,
704-06 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Cf. Doris v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.
1970) (appellate court indicates what path of reasoning discretionary judgment should follow on
remand). See also note 21 supra. This review of the methodology of discretionary decisionmaking should be preserved and amplified.
140 Shapiro, supra note 2, at 761-63. His amendments would also clarify and broaden the device of limited intervention, id. at 762, and clarify the finality of all intervention denials for purposes of appeal. Id. at 762-63.
141 Professor Shapiro retains intervention of right in his rule when created by statute,
or. . . when the applicant is a member of a class by or against which an action has been
brought under rules 23, 23.1, or 23.2, or is a person described in rule 19(a)(2)(i), unless in
either case it is clearly established that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Id. at 761. Granted, it may be undesirable to alter statutory intervention of right by amending
rule 24, see note 131 supra, but I am unable to agree that nonstatutory intervention of right should
be retained in rule 24, even when used to describe situations of relatively high intervention need. I
am particularly troubled by the inclusion of persons claiming "an interest relating to the subject of
the action and . . . so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may . . . as a

practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(i).
This category may be narrower than that created by substantially similar language in rule
24(a)(2), but the former is still an advertently flexible characterization of interest. See Advisory
Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to Rule 19, FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 28 U.S.C. app. (1976).
Thus, it may invite problems of appellate redecision of the type of the present rule 24, though not
on the same scale.
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cant's interest by existing parties; (3) the relationship of the applicant's
claim or defense, if any, to the subject matter of the action; (4) the avoid-

ance of multiplicity of actions; (5) whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties;
and (6) the contribution
the applicant may make to the just determination
142
of the issues.

Judged by the values advanced in this article, these criteria emerge
as exceptionally good work. Under this language, all applicants would
be subjected to a common framework of concerns favoring and opposing intervention that would register and combine differently, depending

upon the case. Professor Shapiro's factors reflect a judicious combination of old and new characterizations of intervention concerns. The list
44
appears complete, avoiding the gaps 143 and problems of obscurity
that plague the present rule. The text seems free of the formalism that

invites dependence on case law; it embraces a variable range of intervention applications, and it can be administered authoritatively by trial

judges. 4 5 In short, the language provides an excellent model for eliminating nonstatutory intervention of right, and thereby improving the
46
methodology for intervention decisionmaking in the federal courts.'
It remains, however, to consider the possible costs of adopting such a
proposal, and it is to this purpose that the balance of the article is directed.
142 Shapiro, supra note 2, at 761-62.
143 Professor Shapiro introduces the capacity of the intervener to contribute as a factor, id. at
762, bringing the rule in line with a number of cases. See note 64 supra.
Judicial economy is recognized as a possible factor in all cases, rather than as a factor limited
to the consideration of permissive interventions in the present rule. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 762.
Here, too, amendment would bring rule 24 in line with case law. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1978);
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1967).
144 The third factor above eliminates past confusion over what restriction, if any, was placed on
(b)(2) interventions from the statement in the paragraph that the "applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (b)(2). There
is presently no such requirement in I (a)(2).
145 It might be also desirable to require judges to place on the record the method by which the
factors in the proposal were weighed. This would probably require an amendment to either rule
24 or rule 52. See note 139 supra.
146 For his actual purpose in using the language to broaden the category of permissive interventions, Professor Shapiro offered the following rationale:
I would favor express recognition of the discretionary nature of the judgment, of the interrelationship of the many factors involved, and of the difficulty of focusing in advance on any
one or two controlling considerations. Recognition that the matter is one of discretion, of
course, should not and need not mean an abdication of the reviewing function. But it does
suggest that there will be many instances in which a decision either way will be acceptableinstances in which the appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 759.
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THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL

Three questions might be raised about the proposal outlined
above. First, to what extent does it diminish the protection an applicant for intervention should receive under rule 24? Second, how significant would the disruption of satellite doctrines presently grounded on
intervention of right be? Finally, how susceptible is the proposal to
judicial manipulation?
Applicant Protection
Uncertainties in the meaning and application of the present rule
make it difficult to conclude that applications of greatest need will invariably be granted through invocation of intervention of right. But it
is fair to say that in most, if not all cases, a tangible need to intervene
will trigger the favorable decisional criteria of paragraph (a)(2) and the
possibility of appellate redecision for the absentee should his application for intervention be denied. The applicant's prospects for ultimate
success in intervening would seem greater in this setting than under the
proposed revision of rule 24. A concern against adoption of the proposal might then be: Why not prefer the present rule, since it maximizes
the likelihood that interventions will be granted to those applicants
whose need to intervene is greatest?
One answer to this question appears from the thesis of this article.
The costs of maintaining the device of intervention of right in the rule
are excessive. There are, in addition, reasons to believe that the consequences from application of the proposed amendment on future applicants might not be as dire as they first appear.
A thoughtful reading of the decisional criteria in the proposal that
favor intervention against the background of the applicant's own circumstances will provide a measure of protection. A pragmatic and
sympathetic characterization of absentee interests is retained from the
present rule. 4 7 The proposal may even increase the likelihood that
certain applications will be granted. Under Professor Shapiro's language, the applicant may combine an interest argument with an argument based on judicial economy, now technically impossible under the
language of the bifurcated rule. 148 The language also adds to the rule a
basis for the argument that the participation of the intervener may enhance the fair adjudication of issues between existing parties 149 and
broadens the applicant's basis for intervening when the applicant does
0
not appear to possess a claim or defense growing out of the litigation.15
Success in intervening under the proposal would, however, require
147 See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.

148 See note 143 supra.
149 Id.
150 See note 144 supra.
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the applicant to deal with the spectres of prejudice to existing parties
and to the court that may result from the addition of the applicant as a
party. Therefore, it might be useful to review some of the points that
applicants for intervention can presently raise to discourage harmful
speculation about prejudice, which should become more significant
under the proposal. An applicant may point to means possibly available later in the suit for dealing with any prejudice that should materialize due to expansion of the suit. At least when the status of an
intervener is viable without a co-party, the court may either adjudicate
the claim of a nominal co-party without also adjudicating the intervener's claim,' 5 ' or sever the claim of the nominal co-party to make a
separate trial possible. 52 Of wider application is the technique of limiting the role that the intervener may play in the litigation. 53 The idea
of limited intervention may originate with the court. 54 At the same
time, there is no reason why the idea of limited intervention, and the
terms by which the participation of the intervener will be confined, cannot be suggested by the applicant himself. The applicant who voluntarily limits the internal expansion of the litigation by promising to call
only two additional witnesses at trial, or who limits external expansion
by foregoing a counterclaim in his proposed answer,155 can forestall
disadvantageous conjecture about the consequences of the intervention.
The usefulness of this strategy is limited, of course, by the need of the
intervener to retain a sufficient number of party prerogatives 56 to protect his interest lest his purpose in intervening be defeated.
Even if the decisional mechanism of the proposal is sensitive to the
deserving and well-argued case for intervention, some may be troubled
by the implications of giving federal trial judges discretionary authority
over so many applications. 57 While appellate review is not wholly
151 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435
(1956).
152 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). See generaly Schwartz, Severance-A Means ofMinimizing the Role
of(Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1967).
153 Particular limitations on the nature and degree of the applicant's participation in the suit
may be conditions upon which the intervention is granted. The alternative of limited intervention
is frequently overlooked. The best approach may be to give the device express sanction in rule 24.
See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 762.
154 E.g., EEOC v. A.T.&T. Co., 506 F.2d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 1974); Stewart-Warner Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964).
155 For further discussion of the particular ways that participation by interveners can be limited, see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 367; Lederleitner & Nolan, Criteriafor Intervention, 1967 U.
ILL. L.F. 299, 303.
156 Professor Shapiro lists as traditional "rights of a party ... full rights of discovery and
cross-examination, the ability to veto a settlement of the case, and the right to appeal from a final
decision." Shapiro, supra note 2, at 727. He adds: "It is both feasible and desirable to break down
the concept of intervention into a number of litigation rights and to conclude that a given person
has one or some of these rights but not all." Id.
157 Distrust of discretionary decisionmaking has been historic because of the lack of reference
to a governing rule, and the consequent independence of one decision from another. Dean Pound
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lacking, 58 adoption of the proposal would require a measure of trust
that trial judges would be thoughtful and fair in the exercise of their
considerable authority. That trust, it seems to me, is warranted. Sufficient time has passed since the amendment of paragraph (a)(2) that a
searching and pragmatic examination of interests capable of supporting
intervention has become a decisional tradition among federal trial
judges, 159 as well as appellate judges.

The weighing of considerations for and against intervention in
each case under the proposal would be a traditional exercise of discretion, 60 as fully a "judicial" function as any other the trial court is
called upon to perform.' 6' Particularized decisionmaking, which is
characteristic of discretion and necessary under the proposal, does not
release the court from its responsibilities to be thoughtful, fair, and
consistent in its decisional methodology. Unless one questions the intellect or fairness of trial judges, 62 however, only the third element of
the discretionary decisionmaking process can be consistently subject to
appellate review. The methodology for discretionary intervention decisionmaking is presented in the proposal. It would not be too great a
wrote of "Lord Camden's saying that the discretion of a judge was 'the law of tyrants,' that it was
different in different men, was 'casual' and dependent upon temperament .......
R. POUND,
supra note 113, at 58. See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 642.
158 For standards of review under the proposal see notes 137, 138 & 146 supra. Professor Fraser has suggested that in some cases the need of the applicant to intervene may be so great that "to
prevent him from intervening may constitute a denial of due process." Fraser, supra note 64, at
483. This concept may not have been thought or written about greatly because the expansive
category of intervention of right invariably included such cases, but it should be more significant
under the proposal. Due process should provide an additional curb on the trial court's power to
deny interventions. On the other hand, it is questionable whether due process provides a constitutional right to appeal per se. See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 641 n.16. See generally Wilner,
Civil Appeals:.Are They Useful in the Administration ofJustice? 56 GEO. L.J. 417 (1968).
159 See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972).
Federal district courts can be more trusted to administer thoughtfully the factor in the
proposal measuring "the nature and extent of the applicant's interest," Shapiro, supra note 2, at
762, because of their experience since 1966 in administering a similar criterion under I (a)(2) of
rule 24. This avoids a problem that can occur when new decisional criteria and discretion are
presented to judges simultaneously. "[W]ithout a tradition for the exercise of discretion, a general
grant of power is likely to accomplish little. . . . If left to their own devices, without any precise
guide beyond a general authorization, they will stick to what they have known in the past." Clark,
supra note 24, at 501. In this respect, the passage of time since 1966 has improved the climate for
the proposal.
160 See notes 132-35 supra.
161 See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 643.
162 "If trial judges are carefully selected, as in the federal system, it is hard to think of any
reason why they are more likely to make errors ofjudgment than are appellate judges." Wright,
supra note 121, at 781. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (1961). See also Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."), quotedin Wright, supra note 121, at 782. But
see Carrington, supra note 121, at 527; Carrington, supra note 116, at 551; Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89, 96-97 (1975).
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step to add a requirement that trial courts place on the record at least a

summary description of the manner in which the factors in the proposal
were weighed. Review of decisional methodology-rather than resuit-should be available in every case.163
Disruption of Satellite Doctrines

Several judicial doctrines arising out of federal intervention practice depend currently on the distinction between intervention of right
under rule 24(a) and permissive intervention under rule 24(b). The
doctrines govern questions of appellate jurisdiction over intervention

denials, jurisdiction over claims brought into the suit by the intervener,
and the propriety of limited intervention. These satellite doctrines

would not survive the proposal. On balance, this result is desirable.
Examination will reveal that distinctions based on mandatory and permissive intervention provide only an artificial basis for resolving these
ancillary issues, and that abolition of nonstatutory intervention of right
would provide a more unobstructed view of each problem.
Appellate Jurisdiction Over Intervention Denials.-Federalappellate courts reverse denials of intervention when convinced that the ap-

plicant has a right to intervene under rule 24(a). 164 But when the

appellate court agrees with the trial court that the applicant has no

right to intervene, the action taken traditionally is not to affirm the denial, but to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 65 The reason is that if the
applicant is not entitled to intervene of right, the appellate court lacks
the jurisdiction to review the denial, absent the exceedingly rare case of

abuse of trial court discretion in denying an application for permissive
intervention under rule 24(b). Naturally, for the appellate court to
reach its jurisdictional conclusion, it must review the denial on its merits.' 66 The formality of associating appellate jurisdiction with improper
denials of rule 24(a) applications has been questioned by commenta-

tors 167 and by numerous courts, 168 while other courts have simply af163 See notes 139 & 145 supra. For an example of district court discretion accompanied by
standards, see FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), discussed in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,
434-38 (1956).
164 See note 23 supra.
165 See Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1947); United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
166 Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 127 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp.,
333 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1964).
167 See, e.g., 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 18, 110.13 [7]: "There seems to be no
basis for that distinction"; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 748: "One of the most fertile sources of difficulty .
But see Moore & Levi, supra note 2, at 585 n.103.
168 E.g., Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977); Blake v. Pallan, 554
F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977); Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 18889 (2d Cir. 1970); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 333 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1964).
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firmed the denials.' 69

It is difficult to rationalize why denials of intervention currently
sought under paragraph (b) of rule 24 should be any less "final" and
open to review than denials under paragraph (a). This article's
proposal to consolidate the situations described in the two paragraphs
into one category should eliminate the continuing basis for this pointless doctrine. Moreover, courts could take the additional step of mak-

ing all denials of intervention final judgments
that are reviewable as
17 0
within the jurisdiction of appellate courts.

Jurisdiction Over the Intervener's Claims.-It is generally held that
an intervener who is not capable of satisfying independently the requirements of federal jurisdiction, yet who wishes to raise a separate
claim, may nonetheless raise the claim if the intervention is granted
under rule 24(a), but not if the intervention rests on rule 24(b).' 7 1 It
may be, as suggested, that the claim of an intervener of right should be
permitted because an intervener fitting the description of paragraph (a)
of rule 24 will bear such a relation to the parties and the litigation as to
be able to support introduction of the new claim under a theory of
ancillary jurisdiction. 72 This does not mean, however, that rule 24(a)

alone is capable of supporting jurisdiction over the intervener's claim.
That conclusion would appear to violate rule 82 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 7 3 It is questionable whether the distinctions based on
paragraphs (a) and (b) of rule 24 provide a wholly reliable shorthand
mechanism for deciding questions of ancillary jurisdiction over the new
claims of the intervener. 174 A freer, more unobstructed operation of the
169 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 568 F.2d 555, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 999
(1978); SEC v. TIPCO, Inc., 554 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1977); Fred Harvey, Inc. v. Mooney, 526
F.2d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Silvergate Dist. Lodge, 503 F.2d 800, 808 (9th Cir. 1974).
170 Professor Shapiro has proposed language to be added to rule 24 to bring this about. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 762-63. This would return practice, apparently, to its form prior to the
adoption of rule 24. Levi & Moore, supra note 2, at 906.
171 "First, jurisdictional grounds must be established for the permissive intervention in the first
instance, and second, they must be shown to support any newly raised causes of action." Blake v.
Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 956 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18,
§ 1921. The distinction predates rule 24. See Moore & Levi, upra note 2, at 581-82; Levi &
Moore, supra note 2, at 902-03, 927.
172 It is probably more appropriate in this context to apply the concept of ancillary rather than
pendent jurisdiction. See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1917 n.24. An intervener
claiming an interest in property subject to the control of the court has traditionally had the support of ancillary jurisdiction. Eliot, supra note 31, at 381.
173 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 1917 & n.22; Fraser, supra note 64, at 483. See
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 64, at 1078.
FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in pertinent part: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."
174 See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURESTATE AND FEDERAL 751 (3d ed. 1973); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 760. But see Goldberg, The
Influence ofProceduralRuleson FederalJurisdiction,28 STAN. L. REv. 395, 422-23, 473-76 (1976).

74:894 (1980)

QuestioningIntervention of Right

doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction would be facilitated by the proposal.
Limited Intervention.-Limited intervention 175 is common when
applications are granted under paragraph (b) of rule 24, yet the propriety of limiting a paragraph (a) intervener has frequently been questioned. 176 Of the three satellite doctrines that would be affected by the

proposal, this doctrine would seem to reflect most accurately the distinction between intervention of right and permissive intervention as
the concepts appear in the rule itself. The power of the district court to

deny paragraph (b) interventions altogether suggests a lesser included
power to lay down conditions of participation. 77 The assumption regarding the paragraph (b) intervener is that, if the terms of participation are unsatisfactory, he can simply wait to present his "claim or
defense" in another lawsuit. The restricted authority of the court to
deny paragraph (a) interventions, and the absence of references in the
paragraph to balancing considerations of prejudice and judicial economy, suggest less power to limit intervention. Still, it seems undesirable to deprive courts or applicants of the opportunity to opt for limited
intervention in situations that presently fall under rule 24(a), 178 and the

proposal represents an advance over present doctrine in raising for
most applicants the possibility of at least limited intervention.
Susceptibility to JudicialManioulation

In the last analysis, the success of the proposal will depend on
whether federal appellate courts accept it as intended-as a release
from the requirement of redeciding by appellate review a broad spectrum of intervention controversies--or reassert their role through manipulative interpretation of the new rule.
Abandonment of the current approach to jurisdiction that depends on distinctions in rule 24
is particularly appropriate since doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are undergoing a
process of redefinition. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), discussedin The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 241-53 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1 (1976), discussed in Note, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction:Gibbs and
Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978).
175 See note 153 supra.
176 See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 366; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 759. For refusals to limit the
intervener of right, see Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1969); Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Abramsen, 45 F.R.D. 97, 103-05 (D. Minn. 1968).
Two cases do appear to limit the I (a) intervener. Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972);
Harris v. General Coach Works, 37 F.R.D. 343 (D. Mich. 1964). See also Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
177 See Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974).
178 "[I]t should not follow from the right to intervene on a given issue that the intervener obtains all the rights of a party with respect to every issue." Shapiro, supra note 2, at 754. Cf Moore
& Levi, supra note 2, at 580 ("It is convenient and theoretically sound to distinguish between the
right to intervene and the rights of the intervenor."). But see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 358 (court
should not be allowed to strike intervener's counterclaim or cross-claim).
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Although the authority of courts to grant intervention has not been
limited to rule 24,179 it is unlikely that federal appellate courts would
devise an alternative basis for intervention. If courts frustrate the proposal, it is more likely to be by expansion of abuse of discretion as a
reviewing standard. This standard applies currently to appeals from
denials of applications for permissive intervention based on paragraph
(b) of rule 24.180 Although the reversal of denials under paragraph (b)
is rare, 18' there is no reason to believe that appellate courts would be
similarly restrained under the proposal. Under the present rule, applicants for intervention who stand to suffer any cognizable harm from
the litigation will advance their case for intervention on the tactically
superior ground of paragraph (a)(2).182 Consequently, the greatest
pressure for reversal is exerted in review of rule 24(a)(2) denials. When
intervention of right was more narrowly confined in the original rule,
pressure upon appellate courts to reverse resulted in the judicial distortion and manipulation of apparent textual limitations of paragraphs
(a)(2) 183 and (a)(3). 184 The inchoate nature of abuse of discretion as a
reviewing standard would seem to provide the means for appellate
courts to structure a doctrine of redecision similar to that now utilized
through intervention of right. Clearly, the usefulness of the proposal
depends on the acceptance and cooperation of federal appellate courts.
It is reasonable to expect that this cooperation would be forthcoming. First, for the reasons offered in this article, the proposal is a better
federal intervention rule and should be permitted to work. It would be
unduly cynical to assume that judges will be less thoughtful than others
in considering points posed in favor of adopting the proposal. Second,
the proposal coincides with a contemporary reexamination of the appropriate reach of appellate activity prompted by critical docket congestion in federal courts of appeals. 8 5 In another multiparty setting,
the Supreme Court has recently questioned the appropriateness of appellate redecision of a trial court denial of class certification when review of that denial had to turn on a time-consuming reexamination of
facts that vary greatly from case to case. 186 This and other recent
179 Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 505-08 (1941). See COLUMBIA Note, supra note 12, at 922. Cf Note, The Usefulness of Intervention as a Remedy in Attachment, 20 MICH. L. REV. 96, 97 (1921) (some state statutes authorize intervention in particular
specified cases).
180 See note 22 supra.
181 See note 21 supra.
182 See note 76 supra.
183 See note 40 supra.
184 See note 41 supra.
185 See note 117 supra. For a statistical summary of the phenomenal increase in circuit court
filings from 1971 to 1976, see P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7 (Supp. 1977).

186 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978) (restricting review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1976)).
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cases 187 suggest that the time is ripe for reconsidering the appropriate
roles for federal trial and appellate courts in intervention decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION

This article has been concerned with the functional definition, critique, and ultimate rejection of nonstatutory intervention of right in
rule 24. From an understanding of the character of intervention controversies and of the appropriate institutional reach of trial and appellate courts, one is led to two conclusions. First, the best rule to guide
intervention decisionmaking is one that permits variable treatment of
applications according to how essential procedural values might best be
served. Second, the purpose and effectiveness of intervention decisionmaking under this rule will be obscured least by minimal involvement
of appellate courts in the decisionmaking process. This model is incompatible with the function and effect of nonstatutory intervention of
right in rule 24. By amendment, nonstatutory intervention of right
should be abolished, and all intervention decisionmaking should be
committed to the sound discretion of district court judges.
It may not be possible to conclude that especially deserving applicants for intervention will enjoy the same tactical advantage under the
proposal as they enjoy presently under rule 24(a). The proposal contains a sensitive apparatus for measuring deserving applications, however, and, with effective advocacy, the number of successful
applications should not decline appreciably.
The climate for the proposal is favorable. The proposal advances
a functional approach to reform of rule 24 undertaken but not completed in 1966. It will also cause to wither questionable and frequently
criticized satellite doctrines grounded on nonstatutory intervention of
right. Finally, the proposal will provide one sensible means for reducing the number of cases swelling the dockets of federal appellate courts.
If the ideas set out in this article have meaning at all, they have
meaning well beyond the intervention context. The author would be
pleased if readers find in this work material for the critical evaluation
of other aspects of civil procedure.

187 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (restricting review under 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1976)); Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (restricting review under
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(l) (1976)).

